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The patterns of social life that support liberal democratic
forms of civic flourishing embody definite rankings of compet-
ing human goods, which will be associated with some versions
of religious truth and not others.  In this sense, the project of
promoting a healthy liberal democratic civil society is inevita-
bly a deeply judgmental and non-neutral project.
— Stephen Macedo1
* Dean and Milton O. Riepe Chair in Constitutional Law, The University of Ari-
zona James E. Rogers College of Law.  Warm thanks to Charles Ares, Barbara Bab-
cock, Tom Grey, and Genevieve Leavitt for their critiques of earlier versions of this
piece.  Special praise to Erika Lewis Bender and Sandy Davis, for superb support in
the preparation of the article.  I also am very grateful to the Dean’s Council for
continued generous financial support of faculty research at the College.
1 Stephen Macedo, The Constitution, Civic Virtue, and Civil Society:  Social Capital
as Substantive Morality , 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1573, 1593 (2001).
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The reigning metaphor in Establishment Clause cases for de-cades was Jefferson’s “wall of separation” between church
and state.  Yet the theoretical bulwark and the separationist ap-
proach it implied encountered severe criticism from the start.
The most serious of the indictments was, and remains, that gov-
ernment “separationist neutrality” toward religion denies the ex-
plicitly religious heritage of the nation and results in a callous
society in which religious perspectives are selectively and unfairly
muted.2  Case law that enforces separationist neutrality is con-
demned as a Court-created misreading of the proper constitu-
tional relationship between religion and the state.3
In many respects, of course, the wall metaphor was always
more myth than fact.  The Court has long allowed government to
accommodate religion in various ways, including practices like
Sunday closing laws,4 providing textbooks to parochial schools,5
tax exemptions,6 and transportation to and from religious
schools.7  Today, however, separationist neutrality has been re-
placed by a radically different neutrality, which I call “accom-
modationist neutrality.”  Under this new approach, government
has significant opportunities to provide support of religion, on
the theory that the First Amendment requires that religious and
secular views receive “neutral” treatment within the public
sphere,8 and that the Establishment Clause allows official sup-
port of religion, within certain parameters.9  Tracking the rheto-
ric, legal strategies, and remarkable advances of post-1960s civil
rights and liberties doctrine, religious advocates have made suc-
cessful claims for nondiscriminatory access to government fo-
rums, have overcome Establishment Clause obstacles to
government funding of religion, and have even prevailed in argu-
2 See infra  text accompanying notes 42-47, 157-82.
3 See infra  text accompanying notes 157-82.
4 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 452 (1961) (upholding Sunday closing
law).
5 Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 255 (1977) (upholding various forms of aid to
religious schools, including lending textbooks), overruled in part on other grounds ,
Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 835 (2000) (plurality opinion); Bd. of Educ. v. Al-
len, 392 U.S. 236, 238 (1968) (upholding program that loaned textbooks to parochial
school students).
6 Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 680 (1970) (upholding grant of property tax
exemptions to churches).
7 Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947) (upholding reimbursement of
parents for cost of children’s bus transportation to public or private school).
8 See infra  text accompanying notes 42–96.
9 See infra  text accompanying notes 97-156.
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ments for accommodation of religion that goes well beyond neu-
tral treatment.
Despite these impressive advances, many conservative relig-
ious and political leaders still maintain that American constitu-
tional law, and especially the unelected judiciary that interprets
it, remain woodenly insensitive to religious values.  The cases
that limit government power to erect religious symbols in official
settings and that deny public schools power to infuse religious
perspectives into the public school curriculum through prayer
and other expressly inculcative means strike them as particularly
egregious.10
Many of these advocates viewed the 2000 and 2004 national
elections as political mandates against liberalism’s excesses, in-
cluding its emphasis on secularism.  Increasingly vocal and em-
boldened by the nation’s perceived turn to the political right,
religious conservative groups now call for a judiciary that will not
interfere with the expression of religious values through demo-
cratic processes.11  In particular, they seek a “non-activist” Court
10 These critics urge that the current Court has not abandoned its activist ways,
but continues to reach decisions that lack historical or textual justification.  As evi-
dence, they cite Establishment Clause case law that prevents government from hon-
oring God through public prayers, directly funding sectarian ends, and venerating
religious texts.  They also cite decisions outside the Establishment Clause arena, es-
pecially privacy cases, in support of rhetoric that the Supreme Court has foisted
elite, secularist values upon the American people rather than enforcing only literal
constitutional commands.
11 Many of these religious conservatives were outraged when, in the spring of
2005, judges refused to interfere with a husband’s decision to remove the feeding
tube of his brain-damaged wife. See  Debra Rosenberg, The War on Judges , NEWS-
WEEK, Apr. 25, 2005, at 23.  In response to their outcry over the rulings, federal
legislators quickly crafted a bill that was signed into law with great fanfare by Presi-
dent Bush. See  Relief of the Parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo, Pub. L. No. 109-3,
119 Stat. 15 (2005).  When the courts refused to enforce this new measure, House
Majority Leader Tom DeLay grimly warned that the judiciary would face legislative
retaliation. See  Tim Harper, Republican Leader Warns Judges:  You Will Answer for
This , TORONTO STAR, Apr. 1, 2005, at A4 (quoting DeLay’s statement that “[t]he
time will come for the men responsible for [the death of Terri Schiavo] to answer for
their behaviour”).  He was joined by other conservatives in agitated calls for greater
judicial restraint and accountability to majority will. See  Hon. F. James Sensenbren-
ner, Jr., Zale Lecture in Public Policy, Stanford University (May 9, 2005), http://
judiciary.house.gov/media/pdfs/ stanfordjudgesspeechpressversion505.pdf (noting
that Congress is considering creation of an Inspector General for the federal judici-
ary); see also  Mark Lilla, Church Meets State , N.Y. TIMES BOOK REV., May 15, 2005,
at 39 (“The leading thinkers of the British and American Enlightenments hoped that
life in a modern democratic order would shift the focus of Christianity from a faith-
based reality to a reality-based faith.  American religion is moving in the opposite
direction . . . . No one can know how long this dumbing-down of American religion
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that will, by their lights, enforce literal constitutional commands
rather than foist elitist liberal predilections on the American peo-
ple.  They also believe far more work remains to assure that
American constitutional law and American popular culture bet-
ter respect the salience of religion and permit government to
take a positive stand in favor of religion over irreligion.
I respond to these doctrinal and sociopolitical developments
with three basic assertions.  The first is a factual assertion: popu-
lar indictments that cast the Court as a group of wide-eyed liber-
als who are hostile to religion are entirely misplaced.  The
Justices are centrist-to-deeply conservative people who have
done precious little to deserve such rebukes.12  The Rehnquist
Court in particular moved First Amendment law steadily and de-
cisively toward assuring that government can accommodate relig-
will persist.  But so long as it does, citizens should probably be more vigilant about
policing the public square, not less so.  If there is anything David Hume and John
Adams understood, it is that you cannot sustain liberal democracy without cultivat-
ing liberal habits of mind among religious believers.”); Doug Martin, Op-Ed., Gay
Marriage Ban Safe Only in Constitution , ARIZ. DAILY STAR(Tucson), May 1, 2005,
at H2 (arguing that “[t]he push for allowing homosexual couples the trappings of
marriage is the work of activist judges, not the will of the people or the people’s
elected representatives. . . . The only protection against an activist state court judge
redefining marriage for Arizona is an amendment to the Arizona Constitution defin-
ing marriage as the union of one man and one woman”); cf.  Dick Polman, Separa-
tion of Church, State Attacked , ARIZ. DAILY STAR (Tucson), May 1, 2005, at A14
(reporting that religious right lawyers’ “desire to breach the church-state wall—cou-
pled with their incessant attacks on ‘liberal activist’ judges and their success in prod-
ding Republicans to intervene in the Terri Schiavo case—is sparking a backlash that
threatens to sow new divisions”).
The ABA has responded to these attacks on the judiciary by creating a “toolkit”
with information and resources for responding to the attacks. See  Am. Bar Ass’n,
Supporting America’s Judiciary, http://www.abanet.org/barserv/attacksonthe judici-
ary.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2006); see also  Allan D. Sobel, Political Assault on the
Justice System , 88 JUDICATURE 197, 197 (2005) (arguing that current events re-
present an “alarming affront against the delicate balance of power that sustains our
democracy”).  A few weeks later, evangelical religious leaders organized a nation-
wide ninety-minute simulcast event from a church in Louisville, Kentucky, in sup-
port of the candidacy of conservative judges and against what they termed a judicial
assault on people of faith. See  Peter Wallsten, Battle Over Benches Spills Across
Pews , L.A. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2005, at A10.
12 Jeffrey Rosen argues that the “unelected Supreme Court justices are expressing
the views of popular majorities more faithfully than the people’s elected representa-
tives.”  Jeffrey Rosen, Center Court , N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2005, (Magazine) at 17; cf.
Toni M. Massaro, Constitutional Law as “Normal Science,”  21 CONST. COMMENT.
547, 547 (2004) (arguing that left and right wing claims of activist courts overwhelm-
ing democratic impulses are belied by most equal protection and due process case
law, which typically upholds government power).
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ious views in profound new ways,13 and the relationship between
church and state today is much warmer than it was only a decade
ago.  This intimacy has been fostered not only by the Court, but
also by state and federal legislatures, and by Democratic Presi-
dent Bill Clinton and Republican President George W. Bush
alike.14 When measured against the actual gains of the past sev-
eral years, recurring charges of judicial instatement of a “brood-
ing secularism”15 ring utterly hollow.
As I show in Part I, federal constitutional law plainly allows for
support of even pervasively sectarian ends, provided it is prop-
erly structured.  The residual case law that suggests a contrary
view has been fatally undermined by recent decisions.16  Moreo-
ver, the Court is very unlikely to reverse its pattern of upending
most of the separationist case law and rhetoric—both because of
the Court’s composition and because the most serious threats
against judicial independence today are being made by those
who seek a more sectarian and politically conservative world.17
Supreme Court nominations and appointments processes are
sensitive to political trends, as presidents and senators seek to
seat Justices who will promote their values.  At present, the
United States Congress, the federal executive branch, and most
state governments are dominated by representatives who gravi-
tate to “traditional values” appeals, including religious values,
and all have ample authority to instate these values without vio-
lating the Establishment Clause.  Indeed, the doctrinal and the
political tides have turned so decisively and pervasively in favor
of conservatism that the “victim” vocabulary of some contempo-
rary religious leaders is wholly out of sync with prevalent socio-
legal conditions.18
13 See infra  text accompanying notes 157-82.
14 Charitable choice, also known as “faith-based” charity, legislation began with
President Clinton, not President Bush. See  42 U.S.C. §§ 604a(c), 9858 (2000).
15 See  Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 306 (l963) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
16 See infra  text accompanying notes 42–156.
17 One cannot, of course, assume that the latter forces will influence judicial out-
comes.  Nevertheless, the Justices can never take lightly vigorous efforts to strip fed-
eral courts of jurisdiction or to otherwise undermine judicial authority. See, e.g. ,
H.R. 3799, 108th Cong. (2004) (proposing to limit federal court jurisdiction and to
prevent federal courts from relying on foreign law in interpreting the U.S. Constitu-
tion); H.R. 3893, 108th Cong. (2004) (proposing to limit federal court jurisdiction).
18 Conservative columnist George Will likewise has concluded that the victim lan-
guage is overheated.  See  George Will, Op-Ed., GOP Goes a Bit Too Far With Faith ,
ARIZ. DAILY STAR (Tucson), May 8, 2005, at H2 (“Christians are indeed experienc-
ing some petty insults and indignities concerning such things as restrictions on school
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Court critics are correct in arguing that the Justices have pro-
tected—critics say invented—important constitutional rights that
violate the deepest sensibilities of some religious citizens.  The
limited right to abortion19 and the invalidation of criminal
prohibitions on same-sex sodomy20 have been particularly divi-
sive developments.21 The Court also concluded in l990—over
howls of disapproval from all political corridors—that general
laws that run against the grain of religious observance do not vio-
late the Free Exercise Clause, absent exceptional circum-
stances.22  This opinion, however, was authored by Justice
Antonin Scalia, who is widely embraced by conservatives as an
exemplary Justice who understands the heart of their concerns.
The case also sets forth three significant exceptions to the hold-
ing and has been undermined significantly by federal and state
legislation.
Moreover, these culturally polarizing, media-riveting opinions
must be read in a wider doctrinal context that is rarely mentioned
from pulpits, political podiums, or talk show microphones. The
Rehnquist Court simultaneously closed off most viable Establish-
ment Clause claims, absent evidence of persecution of a particu-
lar religion, explicit endorsement of an official religious creed,
isolated displays of sectarian imagery, or overtly discriminatory
or improper structuring of support that flows to religious institu-
tions.23  Consequently, modern times are comparatively excellent
Christmas observances.  But their persecution complex is unbecoming because it is
unrealistic.”); see also  John C. Danforth, Op-Ed., Onward, Moderate Christian
Soldiers , N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2005, at A23 (“[C]onservative Christians have
presented themselves as representing the one authentic Christian perspective on
politics.  With due respect for our conservative friends, equally devout Christians
come to very different conclusions.”).
19 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973).
20 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478
U.S. 186 (1986)).
21 I have argued elsewhere that so-called gay rights may warrant constitutional
protection despite the alleged harms to others that such rights may imply, based
primarily on the premise that liberalism so requires.  See  Toni M. Massaro, History
Unbecoming, Becoming History , 98 MICH. L. REV. 1564 (2000) (arguing in favor of a
“rational basis” approach to judicial review of laws against same-sex relations that
compels courts to answer whether restricting such rights in a given context is ra-
tional); Toni M. Massaro, Gay Rights, Thick and Thin , 49 STAN. L. REV. 45 (l996).
22 See  Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).  The significance of Smith
to religious freedom is not as powerful as it first appears, given the passage of legis-
lation that restores strict scrutiny in some contexts. See infra  text accompanying
notes 72-75.
23 See infra  text accompanying notes 213-15.  I address here only federal Estab-
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for religion in the United States, thanks to the very Court that
the critics condemn.
In Part II, I make two normative assertions.  The first is that
these doctrinal and political turns in favor of government support
of religious ends are a decidedly mixed blessing.  Religion’s vital-
ity and free exercise surely are something to celebrate and pro-
tect vigorously in a liberal democratic order, but not without
limits that are mindful of other unifying values and constitutional
liberties.  I caution that the Court’s refashioning of separationist
neutrality into accommodationist neutrality neglects these other
values in several important respects.
For one thing, the Court’s shift has obviously not quelled polit-
ical strife. Religious advocates today express increasingly high-
pitched distrust of the judiciary, despite their formidable legal
victories, and cling to the claim that the minority of Americans
who are not religious, or whose lives depart from particular relig-
ious teachings, exert excessive clout over the judiciary. Victory in
the eyes of such Court critics will apparently not be complete
until constitutional law allows government to enforce sectarian
ends far more comprehensively than the law does today—an out-
come that could render the Establishment Clause, as it was once
understood, a constitutional cipher.
Indeed, the Court is already far down this path.  Substantial
government support now may flow to religious ends as long as it
also flows to secular ones, or is directed to these religious desti-
nations through independent, private choices.  The new accom-
modationist neutrality may even imply that governmental
financial support of pervasively sectarian ends is required, pro-
vided there is a secular purpose also served by such support.24  I
argue that this is a worrisome development for liberalism.
In the current political climate, all elected officials, including
elected judges, must be exquisitely aware of, if not acutely re-
sponsive to, their politically active conservative constituents,
some of whom seek to reify scripture-driven accounts of moral-
ity, civic virtue, and social legitimacy.25  Legislators who express
doubts about the wisdom of infusing conservative Judeo-Chris-
lishment Clause barriers.  State constitutional barriers may also exist but these obvi-
ously are not defined by the United States Supreme Court.
24 See infra  text accompanying notes 216-25.
25 Consider, for example, Texas Governor Rick Perry’s decision to sign bills
against abortion and same-sex marriage in the gymnasium of Calvary Christian
Academy in order to celebrate “with pro-family Christian friends.”  Ralph Blumen-
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tian symbols or teachings into official government policies risk
political backlash and may find that their fortune hinges not only
on fidelity to religious norms, but on fidelity to conservative
Christian religious norms. Attempts to impose even weak ver-
sions of separationist neutrality, as recent Ten Commandments
controversies show,26 may result in shrill attacks on judicial
independence.
My second normative assertion is that the Court should adjust
its First Amendment course in a manner that will better preserve
liberal values.  At the least, the Court should resist further ex-
pansion of constitutional doctrine that would compel govern-
ment funding of religion.27  Public funding of religious entities is
currently allowed, but not required, when a religious entity is
otherwise qualified to participate in a government funding pro-
gram that serves secular ends and is open to adherents and non-
adherents alike.28 I argue against extending that doctrine in such
a way that funding must occur whenever religious and secular
entities provide comparable secular benefits.29
I acknowledge that popular sentiment and the internal logic of
one line of case law30 run against this recommendation.  Accord-
ing to this opposing view, for government to deny equal funding
to religion is a form of discrimination, not respect for religion’s
unique role in society.  Yet there is a competing line of cases, as
well as overwhelming policy reasons, that point in favor of this
recommendation.  Most notable of the cases is Locke v. Davey ,
which upheld a state’s statutory exclusion of scholarship funding
when that funding would be applied to religious training.31
I defend Davey  on analytical and policy grounds and argue
that the Roberts Court should follow its lead.  Government
should be permitted to exercise its funding discretion in a man-
ner that avoids support of religious ends.  To the extent that doc-
trine implies that Davey  was wrongly decided, this doctrine, not
thal, Texas Governor Draws Criticism for a Bill-Signing Event at an Evangelical
School , N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 2005, at A12.
26 See infra  text accompanying notes 108-33.
27 See infra  text accompanying notes 242-59.
28 See, e.g. , Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002); Mitchell v. Helms,
530 U.S. 793 (2000) (plurality opinion); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997);
Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
29 See infra  text accompanying notes 242-59.
30 See infra  text accompanying notes 213-15.
31 540 U.S. 712, 725 (2004).
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Davey , should be reexamined.32
In particular, the Court should acknowledge that neutrality,
whether in a separationist or accommodationist formulation, is
an analytically unsound baseline for freedom of religion
problems.  Although neutrality is a useful tool for selected relig-
ious freedom issues, especially those involving private religious
speech in public forums, it fails to capture the fundamental ways
in which religious commitments both stand apart from and are
embedded in other ideological commitments.  Among its flaws is
that neutrality ignores the ways in which religious freedoms de-
rive from multiple constitutional sources that proceed from dif-
ferent, though overlapping, theoretical bases.33
Standing alone, neutrality principles offer religious adherents
too few opportunities for departures from common rules and
thus offend robust conceptions of religious liberty.  Neutrality
principles also offer no means of reconciling religious autonomy
with other liberal concerns.  That is, they lack substantive guide-
posts for distinguishing between public support for religious con-
duct that is reasonably compatible with liberal democratic values
and conduct that is not.  They therefore fail to grapple with two
profoundly important features of religious convictions: some re-
ligious faiths reject secular reason and pluralism outright as
proper cultural baselines; and fidelity to most religious faiths im-
plies conduct, not just belief or expression.  Official support of
religion therefore can mean reinforcement of conduct that un-
dermines foundational liberal principles of critical inquiry, relig-
ious and ideological pluralism, and secular reason.34
Anxiety about using neutrality as a construct for defining relig-
ious freedoms occasionally surfaces in the case law, even as many
of the Justices continue to invoke neutrality as a theoretical base-
line.  The result is analytically fractured doctrine in which the
Court seems to say one thing while doing another.  Indeed, this
32 See infra  text accompanying notes 226-67.
33 The primary, though not exclusive, sources of religious freedoms are the relig-
ion clauses of the First Amendment.  These reflect an original and abiding under-
standing that tensions between individual religious commitments and collective
commitments raise distinctive legal and social problems. See, e.g. , U.S. CONST. art
VI, cl. 3 (stating that no religious test may be required as a condition of federal
office). See generally  Ira C. Lupu & Robert Tuttle, The Distinctive Place of Relig-
ious Entities in Our Constitutional Order , 47 VILL. L. REV. 37 (2002).
34 See infra  text accompanying notes 260-62.
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underlying tension is reflected in the ultimately oxymoronic term
that best describes its decisions—accommodationist neutrality.
The constitutional balance between religious autonomy and
other liberal values simply cannot be effected by a demand that
government act neutrally.  Rather, as chronic past and present
battles over the content of an iconic measure of American iden-
tity—the American public school curriculum—illustrate, tensions
between our unum  and our plures  cannot be resolved with neu-
tral principles alone.  Demands of neutral inclusion of religious
viewpoints in these common lessons often are intended to dis-
lodge or contradict other lessons that seek to inculcate liberal
habits of mind and respect for pluralism as civic baselines.  Ef-
forts to find a satisfactory-to-all model for resolving these contro-
versies inevitably fail because the poles of the debate want
mutually exclusive outcomes.  A neutrality mantle is ill-suited to
the task of balancing the relevant interests because both  sides
can—and do—seize this mantle with equal force.
To find a place at the public table for citizens who reject liberal
democracy and pluralism as starting points for our public values
is a wildly complicated balancing process.  Assuring that these
illiberal viewpoints and practices are protected, but do not trump
liberal values, is an inherently value laden and politically charged
endeavor.  The Court thus should reject any theory that assumes
otherwise because the theory cannot possibly answer many,
likely most, of the difficult religious freedom questions that the
Court confronts.
In sum, modern discussions about freedom of religion in the
United States need to be redirected.  They must first proceed
from accurate accounts of contemporary doctrine, not hyperbolic
or misleading versions of the case law.  This step is more formi-
dable than it may appear.  Discussions then should proceed to
thoughtful examination of the strengths and weaknesses of cur-
rent doctrine in light of the overarching liberal democratic princi-
ples that undergird our constitutional commitments.  I attempt to
do both in this piece.  I begin with a description of the Court’s




The Court in past eras sought to respect religious freedom and
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maintain a “wholesome ‘neutrality’”35 by preventing government
from funding religion directly36 and denying requests for accom-
modation of religious practices that ran afoul of important gen-
eral laws.37  The theory was that the Establishment Clause
requires government to refuse to advance or inhibit religion be-
cause this best protects the state from religion, protects religion
from government, and is perceived by reasonable citizens as em-
bodying neutral respect for the Constitution rather than disre-
spect for religious commitments.38
A dwindling number of the current Supreme Court Justices ad-
here to this separationist theory of neutrality.39  The ascending
view questions the historical integrity and sociopolitical value of
separationism and insists that separationism drains the public
sphere of religious perspectives.  Several Justices, along with
many commentators, now argue for a very different construction
of government neutrality, a construction that is inspired by free-
dom of speech cases.
A. Neutrality and Religious Speech and Worship
When the government provides speech opportunities to some
speakers (e.g., by opening up government-owned property to the
community at large or by funding private expressive activity), it
must offer these opportunities to other speakers on equal terms.
Even in a so-called “limited” or “nonpublic” forum, where the
government can constitutionally limit access to specific subject
matter, freedom of speech principles require the government to
be even-handed in choosing these topics.40 Excluding only some
speakers on the same topic because of their perspective is imper-
missible viewpoint discrimination.41
35 Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963).
36 See, e.g. , Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985), overruled by  Agostini v. Felton,
521 U.S. 203 (1997).
37 See, e.g. , Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988);
Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986);
United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
38 See  Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2873–77 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(describing the earlier understanding of the principle of neutrality and concluding
that “governmental promotion of orthodoxy is not saved by the aggregation of sev-
eral orthodoxies under the State’s banner”).
39 See, e.g. , id.  at 2873–76 (expressing sympathy for separationism).
40 See  Perry Educators Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
41 See  Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 384-85
(1993).
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Applying this principle to religious speech implies that exclud-
ing religious speakers from a public or limited public forum while
allowing others to speak freely from non-religious perspectives
violates freedom of speech principles.  Beginning with Widmar v.
Vincent42 in 1981, and carrying the theme forward in Lamb’s
Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District ,43 Good
News Club v. Milford Central School ,44 and Rosenberger v. Rec-
tor & Visitors of the University of Virginia ,45 religious groups
have successfully challenged the efforts of particular public
schools to avoid Establishment Clause violations by excluding re-
ligion from campuses or refusing to fund religious expressive ac-
tivities.  The advocates recast the schools’ efforts to avoid
endorsement of religion as viewpoint discrimination, and ulti-
mately prevailed.46
This move was a brilliant and elegant one.  It simply required
the Court to redefine its baseline assumption about religion as a
categorically unique activity that receives distinctive treatment
and relocate the analysis in the familiar territory of free speech.
Moreover, the shift brought religious speech into full alignment
with other constitutional doctrine, which has long treated relig-
ious speakers such as Jehovah’s Witnesses the same, for First
Amendment purposes, as it does political speakers.47 If protect-
ing the right of a citizen to lambaste an official on the street cor-
ner for being a godless communist is on a par with the right to
call her a fascist—and it is—then religious speech must be enti-
tled to comparable First Amendment protection even when it
moves into less open public spaces.
The obvious obstacle to this parity was the Establishment
Clause, which had been interpreted to block religious speech
from more confined publicly controlled venues because citizens
might misinterpret the provision of the public space as a form of
endorsement, or as akin to financial support of religion that vio-
lated Everson v. Board of Education ’s “[n]o tax in any amount,
42 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
43 508 U.S. 384.
44 533 U.S. 98 (2001).
45 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
46 See Good News Club , 533 U.S. at 114; Rosenberger , 515 U.S. at 839-41; Lamb’s
Chapel , 508 U.S. at 394-95; Widmar , 454 U.S. at 276.
47 See, e.g. , Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S.
150 (2002); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942); Cantwell v. Con-
necticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
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large or small”48 prohibition. Widmar  began the erosion of this
Establishment Clause defense to access, which eventually col-
lapsed the government’s main shelter from the freedom of
speech neutral treatment argument in favor of religious groups’
right to equal access.  In Widmar , the Court determined that a
public university that allowed some student organizations to
meet on campus could not deny meeting room space to student
religious organizations.49  University-level adults were not likely
to misperceive accommodation of religious student organizations
as government endorsement of religion.50  Consequently, the
University had no Establishment Clause basis for denying them
access.51
Later, the Court vaulted the second significant barrier to equal
access demands by religious speakers—the government’s right to
bar certain topics or “subject matter” from a limited public fo-
rum. The Court in Lamb’s Chapel  concluded that excluding the
subject matter of religion from a limited forum actually consti-
tutes the narrower and impermissible form of speech exclusion,
namely, viewpoint discrimination.52  It also revisited the assump-
tion that to accommodate religious speech in a limited public fo-
rum would be misconstrued as government endorsement of
religion under the Establishment Clause.53  Rather, it would be
seen as government accommodation of all voices on the same
theme .54 Consequently, instead of respecting neutrality by ex-
cluding all religious speakers from a limited forum, the govern-
ment would violate neutrality by excluding religious speakers.55
In the 2001 Good News Club  decision, the Court added the
third and most powerful dimension to this equal access line of
cases when it allowed religious speech to include the singing of
hymns and uttering of prayers in a government forum while ele-
mentary school children were present.56  The public school in
question opened school facilities to after-school extracurricular
48 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947).
49 Widmar , 454 U.S. at 277.
50 Id.  at 274.
51 Id.  at 273, 277.
52 See  Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 394
(1993).
53 Id.  at 395.
54 See id.  at 394.
55 See id.  at 393-94.
56 Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 111-12 (2001).
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programs and community groups.57  One of the groups was a
Christian organization that sought participation, with parental
consent only, from the elementary school children.58  Even this
explicitly sectarian activity, located in such a constitutionally deli-
cate terrain, was permitted absent more powerful evidence that
the reasonable observer would see this activity as government-
sponsored religion rather than government accommodation of
multiple community activities and voices on school property.59
The final layer of equal access arguments was added in Rosen-
berger , which required the University of Virginia to provide
equal access to funding for a student Christian organization’s
publication.60  The government funding program in question sup-
ported student expressive activities.61  As such, it could not en-
gage in viewpoint discrimination among the student applicants.62
If university students could write on the same topics from a non-
religious perspective and receive public funding, then denying
funding only to those students who wrote from religious perspec-
tives was unconstitutional discrimination against religious
viewpoints.63
Taken together, these four equal access cases provide a power-
ful strategy for pursuing quite adventuresome claims that govern-
ment must accommodate religion as a matter of neutrality, even
in contexts beyond free speech, such as equal access to public
funding and other opportunities.  The strategy denies the distinc-
tiveness of religion and treats governmental attention to religion
as a category, as well as governmental discrimination among  reli-
gions, as presumptively impermissible.  The theory is that relig-
ion is one point of view among many, not a unique practice that
triggers unique constitutional analysis.  The legal strategy
founded in the freedom of religious speech cases also supports
efforts by other groups to obtain equal access to government
funds, because nothing about the structure of this strategy con-
fines its application to religious groups or causes, or to freedom
of expression cases.  For example, advocates of gay and lesbian
rights also have extolled freedom of expression principles as a
57 Id.  at 102.
58 Id.  at 103.
59 Id.  at 112-13.
60 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 845-46 (1995).
61 See id.  at 822, 824.
62 Id.  at 829.
63 See id.  at 845.
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promising platform for novel equal access rights.64
I conclude that using neutrality as a baseline does make practi-
cal and constitutional sense in the context of pure religious ex-
pression.  As I will show, however, the extension of freedom-of-
speech-based neutrality principles to other contexts, especially
the context of government funding, raises profound analytical
and policy concerns.
B. Accommodationist Neutrality and Free Exercise of Religion
One of many problems with a neutrality approach to religious
freedom is that it translates into very weak protection of Free
Exercise Clause rights.  In Employment Division v. Smith , the
Court held that a facially neutral law of general applicability can
be applied against religious dissenters if the law is rational.65  The
1990 opinion stunned observers who believed that significant
government-imposed burdens on religious belief and conduct
should trigger a much higher standard of judicial review.  Neu-
trality, in their view, should not be the full measure of govern-
ment respect for religious autonomy.
The Court itself seemed to recognize the downsides of its ap-
proach about the consequences of neutrality, because it carved
out three potentially important exceptions to the ruling that
favor religious autonomy.  Exclusion of religious groups from a
public program or significant burdens placed on religious actors
by public laws still triggers strict scrutiny in the following situa-
tions: (1) when a law singles out religion for adverse treatment
on its face;66 (2) in “hybrid” cases, where the law burdens both
free exercise of religion and another constitutional right;67 and
(3) when a law anticipates in its design that government will
make individualized assessments of eligibility for public benefits,
such as workers’ compensation programs.68
The first exception covers cases in which government is trans-
parently hostile to religion.  This exception applies most obvi-
64 See, e.g. , David Cole & William N. Eskridge, Jr., From Hand-Holding to Sod-
omy:  First Amendment Protection of Homosexual (Expressive) Conduct , 29 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 319, 325-30 (1994); Nan Hunter, Identity, Speech, and Equality , 79
VA. L. REV. 1695, 1695 (1993).
65 See  494 U.S. 872, 885-90 (1990).
66 See, e.g. , Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520 (1993).
67 See, e.g. , Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
68 See, e.g. , Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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ously in the rare occasions when the government acts in a
manner that signals its intent to disfavor a particular religious
sect.  Yet, it also casts constitutional doubt on a measure that
avoids support of religion by facially excluding all religious ad-
herents or religious entities as such from a government pro-
gram.69  The difficult question in the latter cases is whether such
exclusions of religion should be allowed as a permissible, if not
mandatory, effort to avoid Establishment Clause concerns or to
promote some other legitimate purpose, versus gratuitous dis-
crimination.  The freedom of religious expression cases loom
large in arguments that this is rank discrimination.
The second, “hybrid” exception theoretically requires ramping
up the standard of review to strict scrutiny, rather than rational
basis, when two constitutional rights are burdened by a general
law.  Lower courts have resisted applying this exception broadly
because of analytical discomfort with declaring that the free exer-
cise right can somehow be combined with another constitutional
right to make it a more powerful right, rather than assessing the
strength of each independently.70  Yet the exception arguably re-
mains sound, at least until the Court indicates that it shares this
analytical discomfort and rejects the exception.
The third exception has likewise been read quite narrowly.  It
applies only to situations like eligibility for unemployment bene-
fits, where the system is expressly designed to make case-by-case
determinations.71  Again, however, the exception has not been
69 See infra  text accompanying note 215.
70 See, e.g. , Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 1999) (requiring that the
companion claim has a “‘fair probability’ or a ‘likelihood,’ but not a certitude, of
success on the merits” (quoting Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 165
F.3d 692, 703, 707 (9th Cir. 1999))); Swanson ex rel.  Swanson v. Guthrie Indep. Sch.
Dist. No. I-L, 135 F.3d 694, 699 (10th Cir. 1998) (acknowledging the hybrid-right
theory but stating that “[i]t is difficult to delineate [its] exact contours”); Kissinger v.
Bd. of Trs. of Ohio State Univ., 5 F.3d 177, 180 (6th Cir. 1993) (describing the hy-
brid-right theory as “completely illogical”); see also  Michael W. McConnell, Free
Exercise Revisionism and the  Smith Decision , 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1122 (1990)
(noting that if the Court intended Smith ’s hybrid-right theory to be construed
broadly, it would have invoked it in Smith  itself).
71 See, e.g. , Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1297-98 (10th Cir. 2004) (not-
ing that the “Court has never explained with specificity what constitutes a ‘system’
of individualized exceptions, and . . . courts and commentators are divided on the
question,” but concluding that the “exception is limited . . . to systems that are de-
signed to make case-by-case determinations.  The exception does not apply to stat-
utes that, although otherwise generally applicable, contain express exceptions for
objectively defined categories of persons”).
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construed this narrowly by the Court itself, and so remains theo-
retically viable in other contexts.
Despite the uncertainties that surround all three exceptions to
Smith , they remain avenues that litigants may pursue.  The result
is that the Court has established a neutrality baseline, but gov-
ernment must exceed this baseline, in certain situations, to allow
for accommodation of religion.  Neutrality thus does not fully
capture the meaning of free exercise rights despite Smith ’s lan-
guage to the contrary.
A fourth path, this one statutory, also demands accommoda-
tion of religion in significant instances.  Public dismay over
Smith ’s weak version of free exercise rights was palpable, and led
to the almost immediate adoption of the federal Religious Free-
dom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993.72 Although RFRA was
overturned by the Court as applied to the states,73 several states
since have adopted their own versions of RFRA,74 and Congress
has drafted more narrowly tailored laws that impose strict scru-
tiny in selected federal contexts.75
Moreover, the Court’s rejection of RFRA turned in part on
the Act’s blunderbuss quality. National legislation that is more
narrowly tailored may require states to show a compelling reason
for acts that burden religious freedom if there is context-specific
proof of pervasive state discrimination against religion. Where
such discrimination can be demonstrated, Congress may legislate
strict scrutiny, and has done so.  If such discrimination cannot be
demonstrated, of course, no significant problem of government
hostility to religion likely exists, and Smith ’s weak construction
of free exercise rights is less problematic.
Taken together, Smith  and its progeny set forth a highly quali-
fied, odd version of neutrality.  The combined effect is a form of
accommodationist neutrality, rather than separationist neutrality,
which offers a one-way ratchet in favor of religion: neutrality is
72 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4 (1996), invalidated in part by  City of Boerne v.
Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
73 City of Boerne , 521 U.S. 507.
74 See, e.g. , ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1493 to -1493.02 (2004).
75 See, e.g. , American Indian Religious Freedom Act Amendments of 1994, 42
U.S.C. § 1996a (2000) (allowing religious use of peyote); Religious Freedom Resto-
ration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2 (revising RFRA as applying to the federal
government); Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) of
2000, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-2000cc-5.  The Court unanimously upheld the constitu-
tionality of RLUIPA on a facial challenge in Cutter v. Wilkinson , 125 S. Ct. 2113
(2005). See infra  text accompanying notes 142-56.
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the least, but not the most, that may be required of government.
The baseline can be exceeded where doing so promotes religious
freedom.  Where government laws display no purpose that is hos-
tile to religion, the neutrality demand is satisfied and religious
adherents are entitled to no exemption from the laws’ demands.
Yet a competing, non-neutral desire to preserve religious auton-
omy has led the Court and state and federal legislatures to coun-
terbalance this flat neutrality with important exemptions.  That
is, although the Court sets forth neutrality as its new baseline, it
already has moderated this approach because it offers too little
protection for religious dissent.
It is worth underscoring here that Smith  clearly was not the
handiwork of an activist left-wing court.  Rather, the neutrality
theory set forth in Smith  was coined by Justice Scalia, not by
Justice Ginsburg or even Justice Souter.  Moreover, the net effect
of the spate of post-Smith  state and federal legislation is that pro-
tection of religious conduct has grown in recent years, not
withered. The popularity and the prevalence of these measures
are powerful evidence that religion remains well respected in,
and protected by, American law and politics, not persecuted or
repressed.
C. Accommodation and Religious “Expressive Association”
The modern Court likewise requires “neutral plus” treatment
of religion in a second context of potentially huge significance to
religious groups: freedom of expressive association.  Here too,
the analytical structure is not premised on religion’s exceptional-
ism—the rights are available to religious and nonreligious groups
alike.
The Court has long recognized that freedom of association has
two dimensions, one of which is the freedom to associate for ex-
pressive purposes.76  When a law substantially burdens that ex-
pressive autonomy, the Court has held that the law must yield if
compliance with the law would transform the message of the
group so fundamentally that the group would be forced to em-
brace values that are anathema to it, and if no compelling gov-
ernment purpose justifies that burden.77 The most difficult of
these cases deal with government efforts to enforce nondiscrimi-
76 See, e.g. , Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000); NAACP v. Ala-
bama ex rel.  Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958).
77 Dale , 530 U.S. at 648.
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nation mandates on private associations that discriminate as a
matter of faithful observance of the association’s rules or creed.
Like the Free Exercise Clause cases, the expressive association
cases confront the most intractable conflicts between autonomy
and collective interests.  From a liberal perspective, threats lie on
both  sides of the struggle: denial of associational expressive au-
tonomy is potentially illiberal, but some associations seek in par-
ticular excusal from liberalism’s dictates.  The cases likewise pose
a double threat to principles of equality.  Insofar as the govern-
ment passes general laws that promote equality, any exemptions
from these laws compromise the equality goal.  Of course, gen-
eral laws may also repress or fail to consider the interests of mi-
nority groups, so that granting exemptions in some cases may
better promote equality than disallowing them.
The notable example of this conundrum is Boy Scouts of
America v. Dale , in which the Scouts sought to expel from mem-
bership an openly gay scoutmaster, despite laws that prohibited
discrimination based upon sexual orientation in public accommo-
dations.78  The Scouts argued that their compelled association
with an openly gay scoutmaster would impermissibly transform
the Scouts’ message that a Boy Scout is “morally straight” and
“clean.”79
The Court sided with the Scouts,80 which was a fairly remarka-
ble result given how reluctant the Court has been to permit ex-
emptions from antidiscrimination laws.  The Court in this case
focused on the private association’s expressive rights with little
analysis of how respect for those rights might itself be illiberal or
destructive of the government’s right to advance equality goals
by its lights.81  Relying on a conceptual framework drawn from
pure speech cases, the Court downplayed the conduct aspects of
expressive association to establish a potentially powerful right to
challenge general laws.82  Other private associations, especially
ones with religious identities, thus have relied heavily upon Dale
in seeking exemptions to government policies that prohibit vari-
ous forms of discrimination.83  The Court has yet to clarify what
the full reach of Dale  may be.
78 Id.  at 645.
79 Id.  at 649-54.
80 Id.  at 656.
81 See id.  at 655-59.
82 See id.  at 656-59.
83 See infra  note 207.
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The most ambitious of the cases that rely upon Dale  go be-
yond challenges to direct regulation of private expressive auton-
omy to arguments that public funding likewise cannot be
conditioned on compliance with regulations that unduly burden
expressive association.  A notorious recent illustration concerned
federal regulations that require schools receiving federal funds to
either affirmatively assist military recruiters or allow military
recruiters on campus as a condition of receiving federal fund-
ing.84  The Third Circuit Court of Appeals concluded, based
upon the record before it in a preliminary injunction posture,
that this condition on funding violated the recipients’ freedom of
expressive autonomy.85
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the lower court.86
In the Court’s view, compliance with the funding conditions does
not constitute forced affirmation of ideas because schools can re-
fuse the money, and are free to post signs that renounce discrimi-
nation and otherwise disentangle themselves from the
government’s message.87  Moreover, the government could have
directly required the recipients to allow equal access to military
recruiters; thus, there was no “unconstitutional condition” im-
posed on funding recipients.88  The Court also flatly rejected the
Dale -based argument that the law schools’ associational rights
were violated on the ground that any “association” between the
law schools and the military recruiters was not close enough to
trigger expressive association concerns.  Rather, “[r]ecruiters are
. . . outsiders who come onto campus for the limited purpose of
trying to hire students.”89
Despite the Court’s refusal to extend Dale  to the campus re-
cruitment context, however, the invocation of the case in this sce-
nario indicates just how significant a breakthrough Dale may be.
An expressive autonomy argument was theoretically available to
private associations seeking exemptions from government regu-
lations and even funding conditions before Dale , but it was a
quite weak one because the Court had tended to side with the
84 See  10 U.S.C.A. § 983 (Supp. 2005).
85 Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights v. Rumsfeld, 390 F.3d 219, 246 (3d
Cir. 2004).
86 Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, No. 04-1152, 2006 WL
521237 (U.S. Mar. 6, 2006).
87 Id.  at *13-*14.
88 Id.  at *8.
89 Id.  at *14.
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\84-4\ORE401.txt unknown Seq: 21 28-MAR-06 15:18
Religious Freedom and “Accommodationist Neutrality” 955
government in the inevitable collisions between majoritarian
commands and private commitments.90 Absent a pure form of
private speech (e.g., a parade91), an entirely private gathering
(e.g., a meeting on private property with no appeal to public
membership or participation), or an activity that went to the
heart of a religious order (e.g., selection of individuals as relig-
ious leaders or teachers92), courts were disinclined to hold that
private groups had a constitutional right  to exclude individuals
where public laws banned such discrimination.93  Groups with as
public a profile as the Boy Scouts could not avoid the force of
these laws while also engaging in public outreach and otherwise
participating in public funding and community life.94  Post-Dale ,
private expressive associations have a much stronger basis for
challenging general laws that prohibit discrimination, and for as-
serting that they can engage in other prohibited conduct.95
Here again, the doctrine reveals two things that contradict per-
sistent charges that the Court is unsympathetic to religion and
maintains a high “wall” between church and state.  First, the
Court in recent decades has been the guardian of religious beliefs
and religious expression.  Most remarkably, it has protected not
90 See, e.g. , Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537
(1987); Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
91 Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557
(1995).
92 The “clergy exception” prevents courts from intervening in employment dis-
putes that involve religious leaders. See, e.g. , EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese of
Raleigh, 213 F.3d 795, 800 (4th Cir. 2000).
93 Consider, for example, Runyon v. McCrary , 427 U.S. 160, 179 (1976) (holding
that Congress had power to compel private schools to refrain from discrimination on
the basis of race, relying on the Thirteenth Amendment).
94 Among other things, the lingering shadow of Jim Crow contributed to the
Court’s reluctance to protect these private, but socially and politically powerful, as-
sociations’ right to engage in membership discrimination, especially along the racial
lines that equal protection principles traditionally and explicitly condemn.  As that
shadow has receded, however, and as the Court has become more skeptical of claims
that private groups acting with even substantial government support thereby be-
come state actors, the argument in favor of private associational autonomy has
grown stronger. See, e.g. , Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 842-43 (1982) (re-
fusing to find that a private school was a state actor, despite receiving over ninety
percent of its funding from government sources).  This is especially so when an asso-
ciation challenges laws that prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation
or other grounds that are not suspect classifications under the Equal Protection
Clause.
95 See  Andrew Koppelman, Should Noncommercial Associations Have an Abso-
lute Right to Discriminate? , 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 27, 30 (2004) (noting the
“potentially broad implications [of Dale] and lower courts’ reluctance to follow out
those implications”).
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just belief or pure speech about the belief, but also some actions
premised on those beliefs,96 even when the actions violated im-
portant public laws designed to promote principles of equality
and liberty.97  This is a quite stunning development.
Second, the cases show that neutrality principles do not solve
the most difficult questions within these expressive association
cases.  One can view the expressive autonomy cases as a triumph
of liberal values, or as a worrisome erosion of these values, de-
pending on one’s perspective about the proper balance between
public laws that seek to enforce liberal toleration norms and the
interests of dissenting citizens who assert sincere objections to
these norms.  However one views this clash, it is not resolvable
by demanding government neutrality.
A final aspect of these recent developments is worth noting.
If, as logically should be the case, Dale ’s holding is applied neu-
trally across the spectrum of associations that seek excusal from
general laws, then many groups with anti-equality or illiberal
ends should be entitled to comparable victories.  Consequently,
the victory for the Boy Scouts, a familiar group admired by most
Americans, may lead to victories by other private associations
that are far less popular or benign.  A neutrality approach offers
no obvious means of distinguishing among these groups, or their
ends.
D. Accommodationist Neutrality and Affirmative Action for
Religion:  Religious Symbols and Ceremonies, Government
Benefits, and Government Exemptions
The fourth zone in which the Court has been increasingly re-
spectful of religious interests involves government practices that
reflect religious messages or images.  In these cases, government
practices are challenged as an impermissible government en-
dorsement of religion under the Establishment Clause.
1. Religious Symbols and Ceremonies
Religious themes make countless incursions into public spaces
when government affirmatively acknowledges that ours is a “re-
96 Contrast this protection of conduct with the much weaker protection of expres-
sive conduct under freedom of expression.  See  United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S.
367, 376-77 (l968) (holding that regulation of expressive conduct triggers only inter-
mediate scrutiny, not strict scrutiny).
97 See, e.g. , Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
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ligious people.”98 When citizens—often through the American
Civil Liberties Union—raise objections to these publicly author-
ized religious symbols, displays, incantations, prayers, pledges,
songs, ceremonies, or imprints on official objects such as cur-
rency, the government often claims that such “ceremonial deism”
is allowed by the Constitution.99  Indeed, exclusion of such
images or rituals is antithetical to our constitutional history and
the original intent of the Framers.
In this one area, a bare majority of the Court has clung to the
separationist neutrality model.  Because cases in this area tend to
be highly visible and emotional, however, these decisions tend to
overshadow other cases that reject separationism principles.  The
major lightning rod decisions concern prayer in public schools,
where the Court’s response has been a fairly consistent one: ele-
mentary and high school public students may pray privately or in
after-school gatherings, but the public schools may not directly or
indirectly sanction prayer, whether during the school day or at
official school functions.100
Lost in the debates over the religion-in-schools cases is that
even in this last vestige of separationist doctrine, separationism is
subject to very substantial qualifications. The Pledge of Alle-
giance now contains the words “under God,” yet many public
schools still recite the Pledge, provided that students who wish
not to participate may decline to do so without official repercus-
sions. Although the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded
that the words “under God” make recitation of the Pledge a re-
ligious exercise,101 this case is of dubious provenance.  The Su-
preme Court agreed to review this decision, but did not resolve
the case on the merits.102  Instead, it concluded that the non-cus-
todial father in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals case lacked
standing to challenge the Pledge recited in his daughter’s
school.103  If the Supreme Court had reached the merits, how-
ever, a majority of the Justices would have allowed recitation of
98 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952) (“We are a religious people whose
institutions presuppose a Supreme Being.”).
99 See, e.g. , McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005).
100 See, e.g. , Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 309-10 (2000); Lee v.
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 598 (1992); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424 (1962).
101 See  Newdow v. U.S. Cong., 328 F.3d 466, 487-88 (9th Cir. 2003), rev’d on other
grounds sub nom.  Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004).
102 See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. , 542 U.S. 1.
103 Id.  at 17-18.
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the Pledge in public schools.104
Moreover, as both sides of this acrimonious debate are quick
to point out, religion is already a prominent and traditionally ac-
cepted part of many other official ceremonies, displays, and be-
haviors.  A state legislature can begin its session with an official
prayer.105  The Court begins its session with the incantation “God
save the United States and this Honorable Court.” United States
currency bears the words “In God We Trust.”  The United States
observes a National Day of Prayer by congressional enactment
and presidential proclamation.  The American flag is flown at
half-mast after the death of the Catholic Pope.  And American
presidents and legislators continue to invoke their God (and no
others’) in speeches and other communications with the Ameri-
can people. The only  zone in which the Establishment Clause
arguably still asserts a significant “wall” against official religious
affirmations is in public elementary and high school curricular
and other school-sponsored programs.106  Even here, however,
the message must be indisputably religious, not embedded in
longer political creeds, and indisputably the government’s
message.107
In other arenas, government can support even explicitly relig-
ious symbols and messages, provided it observes the Court’s non-
endorsement and secular purpose criteria for such displays.
These criteria were revisited in 2005, in two prominent cases in-
volving displays of the Ten Commandments on public property.
The Court split the decisions, and split bitterly within itself, based
upon subtle differences between the legislative history and politi-
cal context of the displays.
In McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky , the Court consid-
ered whether the Establishment Clause was violated by a display
of the Ten Commandments placed inside two county court-
houses.108  In addition to the Ten Commandments, the displays
included eight other historical documents and symbols that were
secular in nature and which played a role in the development of
104 Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O’Connor and Thomas disagreed with the
decision not to reach the merits and wrote opinions that rejected the challenge to
the Pledge on the merits. See id.  at 18 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring); id.  at 33
(O’Connor, J., concurring); id.  at 46 (Thomas, J., concurring).
105 Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (l983).
106 See  cases cited supra  note 100.
107 See supra  text accompanying notes 102-04.
108 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2728 (2005).
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American law and government.109  Despite the accompanying
secular messages, five Justices concluded that the Ten Command-
ments displays violated the Establishment Clause, given the his-
tory of the displays.110  The fact that this history revealed an
expressly religious purpose in erecting the displays proved to be
dispositive.111  A key factor was that the Commandments were
originally displayed in isolation, rather than as part of a montage,
and public officials made statements clearly showing that the offi-
cials intended that the displays communicate a religious mes-
sage.112  For example, the officials made statements in support of
former Alabama Judge Roy Moore’s defiant display of the Ten
Commandments in his courtroom, described God as “the source
of America’s strength and direction,” and gave homage to “Jesus
Christ, the Prince of Ethics.”113  After the displays were chal-
lenged in court, they went through several transfigurations until
the Commandments finally became one display among many.114
Even then, however, these earlier official proclamations about
the religious meaning of the Commandments were not re-
nounced: only the displays themselves were modified.
Writing for a five-Justice majority, Justice Souter noted that
the First Amendment requires “neutrality between religion and
religion, and between religion and nonreligion.”115  He also ob-
served that whether government has a secular purpose is rarely
determinative in Establishment Clause cases, but cannot be ig-
nored.116  Moreover, a secular purpose must be “genuine, not a
sham, and not merely secondary to a religious objective.”117  To
ignore purpose would be as “seismic” as it would be “unconvinc-
ing.”118  The Court thus refused to ignore the religious purpose
behind the displays, despite the subsequent efforts to elide Es-
tablishment Clause objections by modifying the presentation.119
In her concurring opinion, Justice O’Connor recognized that
“many Americans find the Commandments in accord with their
109 Id.  at 2728-32.
110 Id.  at 2737-41.
111 Id.
112 Id.  at 2738-39.
113 Id.  at 2729.
114 Id.  at 2729-31.
115 Id.  at 2733 (quoting Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968)).
116 Id.
117 Id.  at 2735.
118 Id.  at 2734.
119 Id.  at 2738-40.
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personal beliefs.  But we do not count heads before enforcing the
First Amendment.”120
Justice Scalia wrote a blistering dissent, arguing that “there is a
distance between the acknowledgement of a single Creator and
the establishment of a religion,”121 and that the majority’s ap-
proach “manipulated [doctrine] to fit whatever result the Court
aimed to achieve” and “ratchet[ed] up the Court’s hostility to
religion.”122  He accused the Court of acting out of self-preserva-
tion rather than principle in splitting the results in the two Ten
Commandments decisions.123  Further, he condemned the Jus-
tices for not delimiting government power to sponsor religious
messages in a manner that would guide policy makers, rather
than foster future litigation over murky legislative intentions and
subtle contextual differences between displays.124
This last criticism of the outcomes is plainly correct.  The dif-
ferences between the Ten Commandments displays before the
Court, as is clear by an examination of the companion cases,
were entirely contextual, and even temporal, in ways that likely
will lead to further disputes over what, exactly, a particular gov-
ernment-sponsored display conveys to the reasonable observer
and what, precisely, the government officials meant to achieve in
approving such displays.  The facts of the second case decided in
2005, Van Orden v. Perry ,125 thus will loom large for those public
officials who seek to acknowledge religion through new public
displays without violating the Constitution.
In Van Orden , a six-foot high Ten Commandments display was
located outside the Texas government buildings among seven-
teen other displays and twenty-one historical markers, all within
a twenty-two-acre park.126  This display of the Commandments
was one of many erected around the country by the Fraternal
Order of Eagles during the 1950s and 1960s.127  Writing for a plu-
rality of the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist acknowledged that
the Ten Commandments are undeniably religious, but noted that
they also hold secular meaning that the government can recog-
120 Id.  at 2747 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
121 Id.  at 2753 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
122 Id.  at 2757.
123 Id.  at 2752.
124 Id.  at 2758-61.
125 125 S. Ct. 2854 (2005) (plurality opinion).
126 Id.  at 2858.
127 Id.
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nize in a passive manner.128  The display satisfied the latter crite-
ria.129  Consequently, the Ten Commandments can be displayed
on government property if officials track closely the design and
context of the display in Van Orden , and avoid the “in your face”
religious explanations for erecting them that led a majority of the
Court in McCreary  to strike down the Ten Commandments dis-
plays in the courthouses.
Navigating these shoals, however, will not be easy.  As dissent-
ers in Van Orden  pointed out, the origins of the Texas display
were hardly different, for Establishment Clause purposes, from
the origins of the displays struck down in McCreary .130  In both
cases, the original intention of those erecting the monuments
likely was a religious one.  In both cases, the displays began in
isolation, rather than as part of a more complex array of public
monuments.  In both cases, reasonable observers could construe
the displays as state endorsement of “the divine code of the
‘Judeo-Christian’ God.”131
Both outcomes also hinged on a bare majority of a Court that
is, and may remain, internally divided by deep philosophical dif-
ferences about the role of such religious affirmations in official
contexts.  Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy would
have approved both displays.  Justices Scalia and Thomas not
only would have allowed both displays, but believe government
can affirm religion over irreligion.  Chief Justice Rehnquist like-
wise held to this view, though not as strongly, but it remains to be
seen what view his successor, Chief Justice John Roberts, will do.
Justices Stevens, O’Connor, Souter, and Ginsburg found both
displays to be an unacceptable endorsement of religion.  Justice
Breyer approved the monument in Van Orden  but not in Mc-
Creary .  New appointees to the Court thus could alter these out-
comes in the very near future, given Justice O’Connor’s recent
retirement, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s passing, and retirement ru-
mors surrounding Justice Stevens and others.  In the meantime,
very slight differences in the settings, histories, and other contex-
tual aspects of religious displays across the country will continue
to determine their constitutionality.
Of course, governments can easily avoid such litigation by
128 Id.  at 2861.
129 Id.  at 2862.
130 Id.  at 2877-78 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
131 Id.  at 2874.
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choosing not to erect religious monuments of this kind, reserving
them for other settings such as public museums, or tracking more
closely the non-endorsement secular purposes cases.  The trans-
formation of the displays in McCreary  occurred only after new
lawyers were engaged to advise the officials.132  Had they been
present from the onset, and had the officials heeded their advice,
the case might have turned out differently.  That is, despite the
subjectivity and highly context-dependent nature of the non-en-
dorsement purpose factors, there is a “there, there” that lawyers
and officials can identify and follow rather easily.  The likelihood
is, however, that citizen groups and sympathetic government ac-
tors will install more such displays, building on the positive out-
come in Van Orden .  They likewise will insist that statements
reflecting a religious purpose should be immaterial in such cases,
and that separationist neutrality is an outpost of older, mistaken
conceptions of the Establishment Clause, bespeaking “brooding
and pervasive devotion to the secular,”133 rather than justifiable
noninterference and noninvolvement with the religious.  In their
view, government should be allowed to affirm religion over irre-
ligion, and should not be required to muzzle its support, or em-
bed it, code-like, within more general messages about American
history.  This particular Establishment Clause battle thus is
clearly not over.
The frenzied response to public religious displays, though,
tends to obscure key facts relevant to the claim that the Court is
stripping the public arena of religious messages.  Whether or not
it is internally coherent for the Constitution to allow prayer or
other recognition of religious heritage in some official places but
not in others, it has  been allowed in many of them—by the
unelected judiciary . The desire for additional  opportunities for
religion to surface in prominent official contexts must be consid-
ered in light of existing government support of religion in many
public arenas, which has been upheld even when religion is en-
dorsed by the most powerful, even iconic, figures in American
government, and even when the religious images are posted on
public grounds in prominent and monolithic fashion.  Also im-
portant to the debate about official acknowledgement of our re-
ligious heritage is that these doctrinal remnants of neutral
separationism hang by a fraying thread.  The only areas where
132 McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2723 (2005).
133 Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
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separationist principles seem reasonably stable concern prayer
and creationism in official public school programs.  In all other
areas that involve religious symbols or affirmations, signs point
toward increasing accommodation of religion, rather than sepa-
rationist neutrality.  In other words, these are not hard times for
religion.
2. Government Benefits
The government also may choose to support religion without a
judicial mandate in another important arena by providing finan-
cial and other benefits to religion, and by building religious ex-
emptions into general laws. When this happens, the challengers
become citizens who object to such accommodation of, or affirm-
ative public support for, religious ends. Here again, the Rehn-
quist Court liberalized older conceptions of the Establishment
Clause.  Indeed, these cases represent the high water mark of ac-
commodationist neutrality.
The Court veered sharply away from its past practice of disal-
lowing government financial support of pervasively sectarian
ends, toward allowing such support if the aid first passes through
private hands and is secular in context and aim.  The Court even
approved direct support of sectarian institutions, though with
substantially greater qualifications.  For example, the govern-
ment now can provide on-site sign language interpreters,134
vouchers,135 computers,136 and on-site remedial instruction137 to
students attending parochial schools, provided the aid is secular
in terms of its content, the religious destination of the service or
funds is one choice among many, and the structure of the aid can
be characterized as “indirect”138 because it is directed to religious
ends by private parties, not by government itself.  Aid to religion
that does not flow first through private hands or otherwise arrive
there through private choices is also allowed if it satisfies Justice
O’Connor’s additional condition, as expressed in Mitchell v.
Helms , that the government must provide adequate safeguards
against the diversion of government aid to inculcation of
religion.139
134 Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
135 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
136 Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (plurality opinion).
137 Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
138 Zelman , 536 U.S. at 652-53.
139 530 U.S. at 859-61 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  Justice O’Connor is willing to
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The upshot of these aid-to-religion cases is that government
clearly can boost parochial schools, faith-based charities, and a
wide range of other sectarian ends, provided it observes the
structural and substantive rules set forth by the Court for provid-
ing this support (i.e., the aid must be secular in content and have
a secular purpose).  Direct aid still poses the most serious Estab-
lishment Clause anxieties, but even these can be overcome.  In-
deed, Justice O’Connor’s retirement could mean that this fragile
remaining brigade against direct aid too will be short-lived.
3. Statutory Exemptions
Establishment Clause barriers also have been substantially
lowered in cases where government chooses  to exempt religious
actors from laws that apply to other citizens who may also object
to the laws, but for non-religious reasons.140  As the earlier dis-
cussion of post-Smith statutory developments indicates,141 gov-
ernment sometimes grants exemptions when no religious
observer has requested, and the Constitution does not demand,
such an exception.  The Court has rejected the argument that
these voluntary accommodations impermissibly advance religion
by giving religious rights stronger protection than other constitu-
tionally protected rights.142  Religious rights can be “more than
equal” in some contexts, without violating the accommodationist
version of neutrality, and without violating the Establishment
Clause.143
The constitutional limits of this “play in the joints” between
assume good faith on the part of religious grantees of government funds, and courts
may presume that grantees will respect “secular restrictions placed on the govern-
ment assistance.” Id.  at 860.  Of course, any funds that support a religious entity’s
secular activities free up other funds to support sectarian activities.  This displace-
ment boon, however, does not render the government program unconstitutional.
140 See, e.g. , Cutter v. Wilkinson, 125 S. Ct. 2113, 2117 (2005); Tex. Monthly, Inc.
v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 18 (1989) (plurality opinion) (determining that permissible
accommodation is not limited to what is required by the Free Exercise Clause);
Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 337 (l987) (“A law is not unconstitutional simply because it
allows churches to advance religion . . . .”); Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 673,
676, 680 (l970) (upholding a property tax exemption granted for church property
because it is “simply sparing the exercise of religion from the burden of property
taxation”); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 315 (l952) (upholding a program al-
lowing public schools to release students during the school day for outside religious
instruction).
141 See supra  text accompanying notes 72-75.
142 Cutter , 125 S. Ct. at 2120.
143 Id.  at 2121.
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Establishment and Free Exercise principles were reinforced dur-
ing the Court’s past Term, in Cutter v. Wilkinson .144  The Court
addressed challenges by prison inmates—including a Wiccan
witch, a Satanist, and a member of the Church of Jesus Christ
Christian who was a racial separatist—to burdens placed on their
religious activities by state prison officials.145  The prisoners sued
for injunctive and other relief under the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) of 2000.146 The Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals had concluded that RLUIPA was
facially unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause because
it impermissibly advanced religion by giving greater protection to
prisoners’ religious rights than other constitutional rights.147 The
Act provides that “[n]o government shall impose a substantial
burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or con-
fined to an institution . . . unless . . . the burden . . . is in further-
ance of a compelling governmental interest” and is “the least
restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental
interest.”148
A unanimous Supreme Court reversed the lower court, con-
cluding that the Act was not facially unconstitutional.149  Writing
for the Court, Justice Ginsburg noted that there is space for legis-
lative action neither compelled by the Free Exercise Clause nor
prohibited by the Establishment Clause.150  RLUIPA fits be-
tween these poles “because it alleviates exceptional government-
created burdens on private religious exercise.”151  RLUIPA also
applies to government institutions where citizens are under such
extraordinary control (e.g., prisons) that their ability to practice
their faith may be exceptionally constrained.152  The govern-
ment’s interests in order and safety must be given proper consid-
144 Id.
145 Id.  at 2116-17.
146 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-2000cc-5 (2000) (amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2 to
2000bb-3).
147 Cutter v. Wilkinson, 349 F.3d 257, 264 (6th Cir. 2003), rev’d , 125 S. Ct. 2113
(2005).  For an interesting argument that RLUIPA is unconstitutional for the alter-
native reason that it exceeds congressional spending power, see Lynn A. Baker &
Mitchell N. Berman, Getting off the  Dole: Why the Court Should Abandon Its
Spending Doctrine, and How a Too-Clever Congress Could Provoke It to Do So , 78
IND. L.J. 459, 495-99 (2003).
148 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a)(1)-(2).
149 Cutter , 125 S. Ct. at 2123-25.
150 Id.  at 2121.
151 Id.
152 Id.  at 2121-22.
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eration in the application of RLUIPA, but this did not make the
statute facially unconstitutional.153  Moreover, RLUIPA treats all
religions equally, such that no particular religious sect gets pref-
erential treatment.154  Finally, that only religious inmates are en-
titled to these accommodations did not produce an
Establishment Clause violation, because if it did, “all manner of
religious accommodations would fall,”155 a result not required by
the Constitution.156
4. Summary
Recent statutory and constitutional developments afford gov-
ernment robust power to favor religious adherents in two impor-
tant ways: by providing them with financial benefits and by
excusing them from general laws.  Moreover, the current political
climate strongly supports the exercise of this power, as evidenced
by the rapid growth of state and federal laws that offer funding to
religious entities and laws that offer protection for religious au-
tonomy that exceeds the federal constitutional protections of the
153 Id.  at 2122-23.
154 Id.  at 2123.
155 Id.  at 2124.
156 That the government can accommodate religious actors by exempting them
from general laws was reinforced by the Supreme Court most recently in Gonzales
v. O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao Do Vegetal , 126 S. Ct. 1211 (2006).  The
Supreme Court reviewed a Tenth Circuit en banc opinion, which had affirmed a
lower court order prohibiting the federal government from enforcing controlled sub-
stance laws against religious use of the hallucinogenic hoasca . See  O Centro Espir-
ita Beneficiente Uniao Do Vegetal v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 973, 974-76 (10th Cir. 2004)
(en banc).  A panel of the Tenth Circuit previously had concluded that the religious
exemption was required by the Religious Freedom Restoration Act because no com-
pelling reason supported the ban on the hallucinogenic tea, which is a central part of
the religious ritual of a Brazilian-based religion.  O Centro Espirita Beneficiente
Uniao Do Vegetal v. Ashcroft, 342 F.3d 1170, 1174, 1187 (10th Cir. 2003).  Sitting en
banc, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the panel opinion in 2004. Espirita , 389 F.3d 973.
Judge Michael McConnell wrote an opinion concurring with the en banc decision in
which he noted that there was no evidence that Congress or the Executive branch
analyzed the religious use of hoasca  before determining that the health risks of the
substance outweighed the free exercise rights of the church members. Id.  at 1020-21
(McConnell, J., concurring).  In February of 2006, the United States Supreme Court
in a unanimous opinion authored by Chief Justice Roberts affirmed the appellate
court decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. Gonzales , 126 S. Ct.
1211.  The Court made clear that the RFRA “strict scrutiny” test “requires the Gov-
ernment to demonstrate that the compelling interest test is satisfied through applica-
tion of the challenged law ‘to the person’—the particular claimant whose sincere
exercise of religion is being substantially burdened.” Id.  at 1220.  It is not enough
for the government to invoke more generally the harms of a practice it seeks to
prohibit.
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Free Exercise Clause.  Once again, the unelected Court has ena-
bled these popular measures, rather than thwarted popular will.
Claims that an activist Court is blocking expression of religious
values and perspectives in public contexts are wholly inconsistent
with this growing, formidable body of constitutional law.
E. Separationist Neutrality Upended: “Disestablishment” of
Secular Humanism as Accommodationist Neutrality
The Court’s rejection of separationist neutrality, its wider pro-
tection of religious freedom, and its erosion of the Establishment
Clause restraint on government endorsement of religion all pro-
vide analytical support to another, very worrisome claim:  that
official exclusion of religion, as such, from public venues or dis-
course and the burdens placed upon adherents by this official
secularism have so escalated in American life that religious ad-
herents face intentional hostility that violates the Establishment
Clause. In essence, the claim holds that governments have estab-
lished “secular humanism,” which, if true, is an impermissible
preference for irreligion over religion.
Although this Establishment Clause argument is seldom ad-
vanced in the courts, and has never prevailed there, I describe it
in some detail because it best describes what animates the most
energetic modern efforts to reclaim the public sphere for relig-
ious messages and purposes, and illustrates the depth of the di-
vide among citizens over religion in public life.  It also displays
the most fundamental flaw in neutrality-based theories of relig-
ious freedom.
At its root, the current culture war is between citizens who
believe American society has undergone a dire social transforma-
tion that has carried us far beyond our religious roots and into
the abyss of moral and cultural relativism, and those who believe
that secularism is the proper public ethic, given our religious het-
erogeneity.  The latter group believes that an official embrace of
secular humanism is warranted, even dictated by our constitu-
tional commitments. The former group disagrees, of course, and
defines secular humanism as “the prevailing, overarching intel-
lectual system in which ‘Man’ instead of God has become ‘the
measure of all things.’”157  This account views secular humanism
157 Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, “He Drew a Circle That Shut Me Out”:  Assimilation,
Indoctrination, and the Paradox of a Liberal Education , 106 HARV. L. REV. 581, 621
(l993). See also infra  text accompanying note 199.
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as a corrosive development:
[A]n indifference to biblical absolutes has been engendered
over the centuries by such diverse media as modern science,
Enlightenment philosophy, and Nietzschean nihilism, and,
more recently, hallucinogenic drugs, surrealistic art, and rock
music.  The result was Communism and Nazism in Europe,
and the culture of drugs, abortion, homosexuality, and non-
traditional sex roles in the United States. . . . [T]he most pow-
erful vehicle of secular humanism today is the public
school.158
These anti-secularists argue in particular that a separationism
approach wrongly permits American public schools—important
sites of cultural values transmission—to inculcate any values ex-
cept  religious values. Court doctrine reinforces that bias, insofar
as it demands exclusion of religious perspectives and practices
from the official curriculum.  This discriminates against Christian
fundamentalism in a manner that is just as arbitrary and destruc-
tive of sub-cultural autonomy and cultural pluralism as is official
race discrimination.
Indeed, the parallel between the arguments of some modern
conservative Christians and those of multiculturalists in past de-
cades is quite striking.159  Multiculturalists in the period from the
late 1970s to the l990s likewise condemned the public sphere and
the public school curriculum as painfully dismissive of their iden-
tities and differences.160  They too challenged public school texts
because the texts marginalized their cultures and identities.161
They also demanded responses that ranged from reformation to
separatism, in the form of public Afro-centric schools and curric-
158 Stolzenberg, supra  note 157, at 622. Interest in overcoming secularism in the
United States apparently is growing.  Ira Lupu and Robert Tuttle recently argued
that “[t]he religious wars in the United States in the early twenty-first century are
not Protestant vs. Catholic, or Christian vs. Jew, or even the more plausible Islam vs.
all others.  They are instead the wars of the deeply religious against the forces of a
relentlessly secular commercial culture.”  Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Zelman’s
Future:  Vouchers, Sectarian Providers, and the Next Round of Constitutional Battles ,
78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 917, 954-55 (2003); see also  Stolzenberg, supra  note 157, at
621-22.
159 I have written at length about the conflicts over the public school curriculum
and noted the parallels between the claims of Protestant fundamentalists and mod-
ern multiculturalists. TONI MARIE MASSARO, CONSTITUTIONAL LITERACY 17, 82-87
(l993).  Parts of this section are drawn from that earlier work and used with
permission.
160 MASSARO, supra  note 159, at 48-51.
161 Id.  48-55.
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ula.162  These activists were joined by others who voiced related
concerns that women and sexual minorities play a subordinate or
non-existent role in the public school curricula.163  In some
school districts, alternative texts, “magnet schools,” and other
curricular experiments emerged in response to these chal-
lenges.164  In so many ways, both the rhetorical and the legal
strategies of multiculturalists and religious reformers remain mu-
tually reinforcing: legal gains by the one tend to support legal
gains by the other, especially when advanced under the mantle of
neutrality.
The religious reformers, however, insist that public school
teachers are far more welcoming of multiculturalist reforms than
of Christian reforms.165  They further maintain that the excision
of Christian viewpoints from the curriculum by teachers and
other school authorities is at least partially reinforced by judges
who have misread the Establishment Clause.166  In their view,
many elected officials, if not public school teachers, would be far
more likely to respond to the appeals from Christian activists
were it not for the Court’s hostile readings of the Establishment
Clause.167
For example, some state legislators would readily pass laws
that would prevent science teachers from teaching Darwin’s the-
ory of evolution,168 or that would require so-called equal time for
the account of man’s evolution contained in the Book of Genesis
whenever Darwinism is discussed.169  The primary obstacle to
these measures remains the Court’s past decisions striking down
bans on the teaching of Darwinism because the sole justification
for the bans was that Darwinism conflicts with “a particular in-
terpretation of the Book of Genesis by a particular religious
group.”170  When a curricular decision is based solely on one
sect’s convictions, it cannot stand.171
Religious parents object vehemently to such cases and believe
162 Id.
163 Id.  at 116-21, 123-24.
164 Id.  at 42-43, 49, 55, 114.
165 Id.  at 84.
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 E.g. , Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 98-99 (1968).
169 E.g. , Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 580-81 (l987).
170 Epperson , 393 U.S. at 103.
171 See id.
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that equal time for creationism172—or, in emerging modern dis-
putes, intelligent or divine design173—is an entirely appropriate
exercise of curricular power because it maintains government
neutrality with respect to unresolved matters of vital importance.
Refusal to allow the Biblical accounts or other religious theories
about the beginnings of life to be discussed in public schools
alongside scientific accounts is both intellectually biased and con-
stitutionally unwarranted.  In fact, these religious parents argue
that “voluntary governmental accommodation of religion is not
only permissible, but desirable,”174 and claim that all of the
Court’s decisions on religion in public schools, with the exception
of the cases that permit student prayer groups to meet on school
property,175 are contradictory to the original spirit of the Consti-
tution.  That original spirit is tolerant of official endorsement of
religion, short of direct coercion of religious belief or conduct.
Building on such sentiments, litigation emerged in the 1980s
premised on the provocative claim that public schools today
proselytize their own brand of religion—secular humanism.176
Invoking neutrality principles, the litigants argued that if Chris-
tian concepts can be excised from the curriculum because they
are inspired by a particular sectarian belief, then secular human-
ist concepts also should be excised from the curriculum on the
same ground.177  Governmental preference for secular humanist
values or teachings in public schools violates both the free exer-
cise rights of Christian students and the Establishment Clause be-
cause that clause bars government endorsement of religion or
irreligion .
Two cases that advanced such a claim are especially instructive.
In the first, Mozert v. Hawkins County Board of Education, Mrs.
Vicki Frost requested that her children be excused from a read-
172 See Edwards , 482 U.S. at 588.
173 See  Cornelia Dean, Opting Out in the Debate on Evolution , N.Y. TIMES, June
21, 2005, at F1 (reporting on Kansas State Board of Education hearings on state
policy on evolution instruction); H. Allen Orr, Devolution , NEW YORKER, May 30,
2005, at 40 (discussing national developments regarding instruction in intelligent de-
sign and requirements that public schools teach that Darwinism is only one possible
explanation of life).
174 Edwards , 482 U.S. at 618 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
175 See, e.g. , Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001); Bd. of
Educ. of Westside Cmty. Schs. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990) (plurality opinion).
176 See, e.g. , Smith v. Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs, 827 F.2d 684 (11th Cir. 1987); Mozert
v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987).
177 See, e.g. , Smith , 827 F.2d at 688.
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ing program that involved exposure to the Holt, Rinehart, and
Winston basic reading series.178 Mrs. Frost’s objections to the
Holt reading series were that it contained passages that con-
cerned secular humanism, futuristic supernaturalism, pacifism,
magic, false views of death, and other themes inconsistent with
her religious beliefs.179  She testified that “many political issues
have theological roots and that there would be ‘no way’ certain
themes could be presented without violating her religious be-
liefs.”180  Themes she identified as satisfying this test included
evolution, feminism, false supernaturalism, magic, and telepa-
thy.181  She therefore asked that the public schools eliminate all
references to these subjects in order to avoid a conflict with her
religion.182
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals refused her request on the
ground that if the school were to accommodate her sweeping free
exercise demand it would violate the Establishment Clause prin-
ciple, set as precedent in the creationism cases, that public
178 827 F.2d at 1060.  For a full account of the factual backdrop to Mozert , see
JOAN DELFATTORE, WHAT JOHNNY SHOULDN’T READ 13-75 (l992).  An excerpt of
the author’s account of Mrs. Frost’s beliefs is as follows:
[A]ll decisions should be based solely on the Word of God; using reason or
imagination to solve problems is a [sic] act of rebellion.  Everyone should
live in traditional, nuclear families structured on stereotyped gender roles.
Wives should obey their husbands, and children their parents, without ar-
gument or question. . . .
. . . [T]he United States has, since its inception, been the greatest nation on
earth.  Any criticism of its founders, policies, or history offends God and
promotes a Communist invasion by discouraging boys from growing up to
fight for their country.  Since war is God’s way of vindicating the righteous
and punishing the wicked, anti-war material—and, by extension, criticism
of hunting or gun ownership—is unpatriotic, disrespectful to God, and det-
rimental to the moral fiber of American youth.
Pollution and other environmental concerns are humanist propaganda de-
signed to provide an excuse for government interference in big business
and for international cooperation, either of which is capable of destroying
this country. . . . International cooperation might lead to a one-world gov-
ernment, which would be the reign of the Antichrist and bring about the
end of the world. . . .
. . . Christianity—that is, Protestant fundamentalism—is the one true relig-
ion and the religion on which the United States was founded.
Id.  at 36-37.  The author concludes that the objections to the public school curricu-
lum in Mozert  were bound by the protestors’ “total commitment to one religious
and cultural group, to the exclusion of globalism and multiculturalism.”  Id.  at 37.
179 Mozert , 827 F.2d at 1062.
180 Id.  at 1064.
181 Id.
182 Id.
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\84-4\ORE401.txt unknown Seq: 38 28-MAR-06 15:18
972 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84, 2005]
schools cannot tailor curricula to satisfy a particular religion.183
The court held that mere exposure to the themes contained in
the Holt series was not an undue burden on the plaintiff’s free
exercise of religion, given that the students were not required to
affirm any belief or to engage in a practice prohibited by their
religion.184  Moreover, Tennessee law permitted Mrs. Frost to
send her children to a private sectarian school or to teach them at
home.185  Having elected to send her children to public school,
she could not excise all portions of the curriculum that she found
offensive.186
In the second case of relevance, Smith v. Board of Commis-
sioners , Ishmael Jaffree sued the Mobile County School Board
on the ground that certain prayer activity in the public schools
violated the Establishment Clause.187  Douglas Smith and others
intervened in the case and argued that if Jaffree were to win his
case then the court would be violating their free exercise
rights.188  In the alternative, the intervenors argued that the Ala-
bama public schools had established the religions of “secularism,
humanism, evolution, materialism, agnosticism, atheism and
others.”189  As in Mozert , the objections to the public school cur-
riculum included the value relativism built into the textbooks.190
The intervenors also complained that the history and social stud-
ies textbooks downplayed the importance of religion in history
and American society.191  The intentional omission of these facts,
they argued, should be just as offensive to First Amendment val-
ues as was the mandated omission of discussion of evolution in
183 Id.  For thoughtful discussions of whether granting an exemption from a gen-
eral law, including a compulsory education law, to a religious minority constitutes
impermissible endorsement of religion rather than constitutional respect for plural-
ism, see generally, Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise , 1990 SUP. CT.
REV. 1; William P. Marshall, The Case Against the Constitutionally Compelled Free
Exercise Exemption , 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 357 (l990); Michael W. McConnell,
Free Exercise Revisionism and the  Smith Decision , 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109 (l990);
Geoffrey R. Stone, Constitutionally Compelled Exemptions and the Free Exercise
Clause , 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 985 (l986); Mark Tushnet, The Emerging Principle
of Accommodation of Religion (Dubitante) , 76 GEO. L.J. 1691 (l988).
184 Mozert , 827 F.2d at 1065.
185 Id.
186 Id.  at 1064.
187 827 F.2d 684, 686 (11th Cir. 1987).
188 Id.
189 Id.
190 Id.  at 690-91.
191 Id.  at 693.
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earlier Court decisions.192
The appellate court disagreed, noting that “[s]electing a text-
book that omits a particular topic for nonreligious reasons is sig-
nificantly different from requiring the omission of material
because it conflicts with a particular religious belief.”193 Al-
though the curriculum may have contained ideas that were con-
sistent with secular humanism, it also contained information
consistent with theistic religion.194  The principal purpose in us-
ing the textbooks, despite the omissions and coincidences with
secular humanism beliefs contained in the texts, was not to estab-
lish the religion of secular humanism, but rather to advance the
legitimate secular purpose of “attempt[ing] to instill in Alabama
public school children such values as independent thought, toler-
ance of diverse views, self-respect, maturity, self-reliance and log-
ical decision-making.”195
Had the courts in Mozert  or Smith  ruled otherwise, of course,
virtually all curricular decisions would have become potential
constitutional land mines. Much secular material has theological
resonance, as Mrs. Frost herself noted. If either court had charac-
terized the secular materials in question as antireligious, and thus
a violation of the Establishment Clause, it could have left “public
education in shreds.”196  Yet, the claim that the public school cur-
riculum cannot be cleansed of religion without establishing secu-
lar humanism, or that establishing an irreligious environment
that for devout students is alien, even hostile, is hardly frivolous.
Rather, like the Catholics of the 1840s who objected to the
strongly Protestant and overtly anti-Catholic bias of northeastern
urban schools,197 Christian fundamentalists of the late twentieth
and early twenty-first centuries, as well as members of some
192 Id.
193 Id.  at 694.
194 See id.
195 Id.  at 692.
196 People ex rel.  McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 235 (1948) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) (“If we are to eliminate everything that is objectionable to any of these
warring sects or inconsistent with any of their doctrines, we will leave public educa-
tion in shreds.”).
197 See Diane Ravitch’s compelling account of these schisms in THE GREAT
SCHOOL WARS:  NEW YORK CITY, 1805-1973 (l974).  She describes the “open slurs”
against Catholicism in textbooks of the mid-1800s and the objections of nineteenth-
century Catholics that public schools were imposing an alien culture on their chil-
dren.  Id.  at 35.  The ultimate compromise, if it can be called that, was secession of
Catholics to parochial schools where they could teach their version of the Bible,
though without public funding.
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other religious and cultural minorities, clearly do have reason to
feel that modern public schools’ emphasis on value relativism
and tolerance of differences—including different religions, cul-
tures, sexual practices and other mores—is antagonistic toward
their religious tenets. By failing to see that this is the root of
many adherents’ objections to modern society, as well as to mod-
ern law, critics miss the magnitude of the cultural divide we cur-
rently face and avoid confrontation with a difficult truth:  no
resolution of this impasse will satisfy all sides.
The cases also demonstrate why some religious reformers ask
too much of our constitutional order.  Just as similar efforts of
the nineteenth-century Catholics to tailor the public school cur-
riculum to their parochial preferences failed,198 modern evangeli-
cal Christians’ attempts to tailor public institutions to their
parochial preferences must also fail if we are to remain culturally
and constitutionally committed to liberal values.  For American
public institutions to substitute religious faith for secular reason,
or even to place religious faith in a coequal position with secular
reason, would cut too deeply against these liberal democratic
values.
It also would ask the impossible.  Public institutions, especially
public schools, cannot affirm all religions neutrally or equally,
given their expressly inculcative roles, the vast range of religious
beliefs in the United States, and the pervasiveness of some reli-
gions’ indictments of modern public values.  Public schools are
engaged in a form of government speech that is inescapably
didactive, which means they can and must choose value-laden
messages.  These substantive curricular decisions are subject to
scant judicial oversight, not because the Supreme Court is hostile
to religion, or even because it is committed to a liberal, secular
humanist agenda, but because the Court is unwilling to supervise
local curricular choices short of powerful evidence of systematic
abuse of First Amendment values.199  Providing religious parents
with vouchers to pursue alternative curricula for their children
198 They have continued to be unsuccessful in the lower courts in similar cases.
See, e.g. , Swanson ex rel.  Swanson v. Guthrie Indep. Sch. Dist. No. I-L, 135 F.3d 694
(10th Cir. 1998) (refusing home-schooled student the right to pick and choose classes
to attend at public school); Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d 525 (1st
Cir. 1995) (refusing students the right to be excused from a student assembly be-
cause of its “sexy” content).
199 See, e.g. , Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (l988); Bethel Sch.
Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (l986).
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may ease the tension produced by schools’ embrace of secular
humanism and other liberal values, but it in no way implies that
government cannot pursue these ideals in its own schools.
Yet, the curriculum debates illustrate a much deeper dilemma
of a liberal democratic order that religious freedom doctrine
must acknowledge.  Neither deeply religious citizens like Vicki
Frost or Douglas Smith nor  strongly secularist citizens like Ish-
mael Jaffree will be, or should  be, satisfied by the government’s
ongoing balance of cultural assimilation and religious pluralism
interests. Each wants the courts to enforce a constitutional right
to a polar  version of religious freedom and government neutral-
ity. Frost and Smith believe in strong versions of accommoda-
tionist neutrality:  the government should acknowledge and
reinforce religious values as powerfully as it does secular values
and should give curricular space to religious doctrine.  At the
very least, they want a virtually unchecked right to opt out of
common commitments that conflict with their religious values—
to be let alone by the secular world, unmolested, for free relig-
ious inquiry and practice. At the very most, however, they de-
mand transformation of public culture to match their religious
values and government support of their religious ends.  To them,
neutrality requires a radical readjustment of the cultural baseline
to embrace religion.
Jaffree, in contrast, believes in strong versions of separationist
neutrality: public schools should give no curricular space to
teaching religious values, though they can teach about religions
when it is relevant to secular courses. He, too, seeks to be left
alone, but in a more pervasive sense. To him, neutrality means
that religion must be absent from the public sphere or, at most,
must assume a muted, non-aspirational, and above all, non-incul-
cative role.
Neutrality is unworkable at both  of these poles, for a non-neu-
tral reason: both produce results that undermine liberal values,
and both strike most of us as a perversion of the complex balance
between democracy and dissent.  As I have demonstrated, strong
separationist neutrality has always been controversial because it
affords too little voice to religious perspectives.  Over forty years
ago, Justice Goldberg first warned that neutrality of this sort can
produce “a brooding and pervasive devotion to the secular and a
passive, or even active, hostility to the religious.”200  The Court
200 Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 306 (1963) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
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has never yielded to such strong separationist desires.
The Rehnquist Court, of course, went even farther to prevent
the potential extremes of separationism.  It allowed government
accommodation of sectarian beliefs through tax credits,201 ex-
emptions from federal discrimination laws,202 policies that permit
prayer groups to meet on public school property,203 federal
grants awarded to organizations tied to religious denominations
that promote abstinence and adoption as alternatives to abor-
tion,204 and rules that bar health care providers who are recipi-
ents of federal funds from discussing abortion as an option with
patients.205  As such, religion today is hardly cleansed from the
American public sphere,206 Ten Commandments and school
prayer controversies notwithstanding.
These developments do not mean, however, that Mrs. Frost’s
extreme version of accommodationist neutrality would have pre-
vailed before the Rehnquist Court.  It surely would not have.
The Court doubtless would have rejected her claims as too intru-
sive on government power to craft common standards, including
ones that promote liberal and secular values.  Yet, this outcome
no longer is as doctrinally evident or defensible as it once was, or
should be.  Rather, the Establishment Clause defense against
Mrs. Frost’s claims is far weaker than in the 1980s, which makes
her basic theory—that hostility to religion, not the Constitution,
is the real basis for its pervasive exclusion from public school cur-
ricula—doctrinally plausible.
The reason is that the Court has sanctioned religious exemp-
tions in many other contexts where the public stakes were at least
as high as they were in Mozert  and Smith . Indeed, in Dale , the
stakes clearly were much higher because the requested exemp-
tion was not a matter of mere administrative inconvenience.  The
201 Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
202 Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000); Corp. of the Presiding Bishop
of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987); cf.
Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 18 n.8 (1989) (plurality opinion) (noting
that exemptions must not impose serious burdens on non-beneficiaries, and must
“alleviate government intrusions that might significantly deter adherents of a partic-
ular faith from conduct protected by the Free Exercise Clause”).
203 See supra  text accompanying notes 56-59.
204 See ACLU Challenges Abstinence Program , USA TODAY, May 17, 2005, at
3A.
205 Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
206 Thus, the powerful imagery of Richard John Neuhaus’ influential book, THE
NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE (l984), is no longer so compelling.
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Boy Scouts sought excusal from laws that protect other citizens
from discrimination—laws supported by reasons that clearly
qualify as important, if not compelling government interests.  If
imposition of important secular standards no longer is permissi-
ble when the standards conflict with religious standards, then
laws that facially exclude religion to avoid appearing to endorse
it (e.g., a school rule that removes only religious messages from
the curriculum), or even facially neutral policies that are drafted
without the interests of religious groups in mind (e.g., a rule that
requires that all student groups observe nondiscrimination man-
dates with respect to student membership)207 may also violate
the Establishment Clause.  No compelling constitutional reason
arguably supports these failures to accommodate religious
interests.
Requests that children be excused from parts of the curriculum
that parents regard as hostile to their religion, such as instruction
in Darwin’s theory of evolution, also become more powerful.
Only a lingering misperception about the “wall” between church
and state, now itself viewed as hostile to religion by some mem-
bers of the Court, arguably remains as a basis for the exclusion of
religion from these curricular contexts.
Even the argument that science texts that stress secular con-
cepts and omit religious alternative theories about life’s begin-
207 This issue has arisen, though not always couched as an Establishment Clause
problem, at several law schools across the country.  The Christian Legal Society
Chapter at several law schools challenged the schools’ non-discrimination policies as
applied to religious student organizations.  The society argues that a religious stu-
dent organization may require that its leaders conform to its religious creed.  In one
of these cases, brought against Hastings Law School, the law school prevailed on the
Establishment Clause, due process, and equal protection claims.  Christian Legal
Soc’y Chapter of Univ. of Cal. v. Kane, No. C 04-4484 JSW, 2005 WL 850864 (N.D.
Cal. Apr. 12, 2005).  Still unresolved are the free exercise and freedom of association
claims.
The school’s non-discrimination rule applies across the board and currently makes
no exceptions for religious groups. See id.  at *2.  The religious society argues,
among other things, that failure to exempt religious groups from the nondiscrimina-
tion requirement violates the freedom of expressive association principles of
Dale  because it entails forced association with ideas that the members find repug-
nant, and may also violate the freedom of speech prohibition against forced affirma-
tion of belief set forth in cases like West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnette , 319 U.S. 624 (1943). See Christian Legal Soc’y , 2005 WL 850864, at *2.
See generally  Note, Leaving Religious Students Speechless:  Public University An-
tidiscrimination Policies and Religious Student Organizations , 118 HARV. L. REV.
2882 (2005) (arguing that the antidiscrimination policies are unconstitutional as ap-
plied to dissenting expressive religious student organizations).
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nings thereby establish “anti-religion,” in violation of the
Establishment Clause, becomes plausible.  Schools’ attempts to
avoid religion as a category may be seen as invidious viewpoint
discrimination in a setting dedicated to critical inquiry rather
than as legitimate governmental control over the content of its
curriculum.  Advocates can remind courts that even elementary
school children do not “shed their constitutional rights . . . at the
schoolhouse gate”208and demand that public curricula must not
suppress religious perspectives on the themes it presents.  Again,
absent an Establishment Clause explanation for excising relig-
ious perspectives, the viewpoint discrimination argument gains
considerable force.
The fundamental problem with this narrow interpretation of
public schools’ power to control the curriculum, as well as with
strong versions of accommodationist neutrality, is the problem
identified in Mozert : it equates “secular” with “anti-religious,”
and “non-neutral” with “failure to accommodate” in ways that
cannot be sustained and grants adherents undue power to object
to common laws and baseline liberal principles.209  To weaken
the Establishment Clause this much ignores the distinctive dan-
gers of placing responsibility for crafting religious messages in
government hands.
It also could leave the entire public arena, not just the public
school curriculum, in shreds.  To pursue accommodationist neu-
trality to its logical conclusion denies the possibility of common
secular space that is not viewpoint discriminatory or hostile to
religion.  The Rehnquist Court recognized this, because it ad-
hered to separationist principles in the curricular arena.  As Jus-
tice Scalia has observed, democracy is compromised to an
unacceptable degree if religious adherents can pick and choose
which common rules to observe.210  The burden on citizens who
object to general laws is a “consequence of democratic govern-
ment [that] must be preferred to a system in which each con-
science is a law unto itself or in which judges weigh the social
importance of all laws against the centrality of all religious be-
liefs.”211  Public schools, of course, are not religious parents’ only
208 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
209 To do so violates the principle set forth a decade ago by Eisgruber and Sager,
which is to protect rather than privilege religion.  Christopher L. Eisgruber & Law-
rence G. Sager, 74 TEX. L. REV. 577, 613 (1996) (book review).
210 Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-80 (1990).
211 Id.  at 890.
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option.  They can home-school, send their children to parochial
school, or supplement public school curricula with family- and
religion-centered alternative materials.  None of these is a wholly
satisfactory alternative, of course.  Many multiculturalists too
find these options to be suboptimal, if not insulting.  But turning
public school curricula choices or an individual student’s right to
tailor her schooling to her religious needs into a judicially moni-
tored first amendment exercise is likewise suboptimal, to say the
least.
Obviously, there is no one line, no Archimedean point, where
all can agree to separate our collective will from the individual
religious liberty of dissenting citizens in pursuit of worthy liberal
democratic principles. Nor is there any a priori  baseline for gov-
ernment policy decisions, including public school curricular
choices, that is religion-neutral in a way that will satisfy all con-
stituents or promote ideological pluralism optimally across all
contexts, whether the context is the public school curriculum or
any other government-supported expression of common
values.212
Yet several points are worth underscoring.  First is that the far-
thest extremes of the secular-religious balance have not been en-
dorsed by the Court at any point in its history.  Second is that the
Court in recent years has moved very decisively toward allowing
much greater government support of religion than it allowed de-
cades earlier.  Third is that these recent developments lend ana-
lytical support to a legal theory that should sound far-fetched:
that the Establishment Clause requires  official support for relig-
ion in public arenas because modern versions of secular princi-
ples constitute anti -religion.  I argue that this doctrinal march to
the cliffs needs to be noted, and halted.  Although the Court, at
times, seems to recognize both the limits and the perils of its ac-
commodationist neutrality and abandons this rhetoric in some
cases, it does so without abandoning the underlying logic and
holdings of other cases that make these radical arguments
plausible.
For example, in the realm of public funding for religious ends,
212 An especially illuminating attempt to manage this conflict in the public school
setting can be found in Amy Gutmann’s superb book, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION
(l987).  Schools have always been the most active battlegrounds in the wars between
secularists and religious people seeking to forge a common paideia , by their lights.
The advent of vouchers may ease some of these strains, but is unlikely to end them.
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the Court has pulled back from the farthest, logical extentions of
its accommodationist neutrality approach, but has not renounced
that approach.  The result is fractured doctrine that is difficult to
apply or to justify analytically.  I turn now to recent develop-
ments in this arena.
II
WAY BEYOND SEPARATIONIST NEUTRALITY:
MANDATORY GOVERNMENT FUNDING?
One of the far-reaching and disturbing implications of the ac-
commodationist neutrality principle reached the Supreme Court
in 2004.  The Court rejected the proposed application of the prin-
ciple in this case, but it did so on fairly narrow and somewhat
unconvincing grounds.
The claim before the Court was that government today not
only may add religious recipients to its funding opportunities
without violating the Establishment Clause, but that it must  do
so as a matter of neutral principles. The argument for this result
goes as follows: providing equal access to public space opportuni-
ties for religious speakers is now required, even though this is a
direct, financially significant benefit to religion. Providing fund-
ing for religion likewise is now allowed  where religious destina-
tions are one of many that can be selected by private party
recipients of the funds and all destinations serve a secular pur-
pose.  In some circumstances, funding is allowed without  the in-
tervention of a private party break in the funding chain.213
Denying equal access to funding is unconstitutional where the
denial is viewpoint sensitive,214 and religion can be characterized
as a viewpoint.
Indeed, refusal to fund only religious groups as such , where
213 Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (plurality opinion).  Four Justices in
Mitchell  were satisfied that direct aid (in this case, computers) was constitutional
whenever the content of the aid is secular and the structure of the aid program is
neutral as to all applicants.  Id.  at 820.  Two Justices concluded that direct aid is
permissible only if a program is neutral and has safeguards to prevent the diversion
of the aid to explicitly sectarian ends. Id.  at 865-66 (O’Connor, J., concurring,
joined by Breyer, J.).  Thus, six Justices would allow direct aid to religious institu-
tions.  It remains to be seen whether the “divertibility” caveat of the two concurring
Justices will hold or eventually fall.  Indirect aid, of course, was approved by a ma-
jority of the Court in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris , 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
214 See  Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995)
(requiring the University of Virginia to fund a campus religious magazine on equal
terms with its subsidization of other student publications).
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this exclusion appears on the face of the funding rules, arguably
is a presumptive violation of recipients’ free exercise rights under
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah .215 The
facial exclusion of religious beneficiaries is, on this account, overt
discrimination that triggers strict scrutiny of the measure.  Mere
desire to ease the stress on already strapped state or federal cof-
fers is not a compelling reason to single out one subcategory of
potential recipients simply because they are religious or would
apply their public funds to sectarian ends. In the new world of
constitutional law, selective funding that excludes only religion
from a funding program, where religious entities also serve the
secular purposes of the funding program, constitutes intolerable
discrimination against religion, not respect for religious pluralism
or legitimate government funding discretion.
This argument competes with another line of cases that allows
subject-matter-specific and, in some contexts, even viewpoint-
specific restrictions on government spending. In cases involving
abortion services,216 funding for the arts,217 and government-sup-
ported programs to promote access to the Internet,218 govern-
ment has reserved the right to define the scope of its programs
and to determine what ideas to advance with its funds. Although
the Court has not always been consistent in applying these princi-
ples,219 the case law observes a plain difference between direct
government regulation of people’s private behaviors “off the
funded job” and governmental financial incentives for particular
behaviors “on the funded job.”220  It also recognizes that govern-
ment itself has the right to express its own views, even at tax-
payer expense, without violating dissenting citizens’ right not to
be compelled to speak.221
The distinction between private expressive autonomy and gov-
ernment regulatory expressive power also has been important in
the Free Exercise Clause cases, which permit substantial burdens
on religious freedom before demanding exemptions from general
215 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
216 Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
217 Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998).
218 United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194 (2003) (plurality opinion).
219 See, e.g. , Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 548-49 (2001) (striking
down condition on legal aid funding that prohibited lawyers from seeking to reform
federal or state welfare laws).
220 See Finley , 524 U.S. 569; Rust , 500 U.S. 173.
221 See  Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 125 S. Ct. 2055 (2005).
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laws.222  Here, too, the failure to fund  one’s religious conduct
typically has not been viewed as the same type of government
burden as has a direct prohibition on that conduct.
More generally, constitutional law has long observed a distinc-
tion between expression and conduct that gives government
much greater ability to regulate the latter.  Consequently, to ex-
tend liberty of religious expression principles to require that re-
ligious expression, through conduct, must be funded  is to ramp it
up far beyond what is normally deemed necessary for other
forms of individual expression.
Finally, the argument that religion is a viewpoint and not a
subject potentially collides with a primary strategy of advocates
in the religious exemption cases.  When such advocates seek gov-
ernmental accommodations for religious beliefs they often con-
front the claim that accommodation is favoritism in violation of
the Establishment Clause.  In response, they maintain that the
Constitution permits “‘nondiscriminatory  religious-practice ex-
emption[s],’ not sectarian ones.”223  That is, they observe that
there is a distinction between an exemption for religion as a cate-
gory  and the narrower treatment of religion as a point of view ,
and believe distinctive treatment of the former, as such , may be
permissible where the latter is not.224  Unless this is a one-way
ratchet that only works when it affords religion greater protec-
tion, it makes sense to observe the distinction in both contexts.
For all of these reasons, governmental discretion not to fund re-
ligion as a category seems constitutionally defensible, though it is
not without powerful counterarguments.  The recent case of
Locke v. Davey225 is a superb illustration of the tension between
these competing doctrinal lines.
A. Locke v. Davey
The Court in Davey addressed the State of Washington’s
Promise Scholarship Program, under which recipients were al-
lowed to use state funds to support college education in any pri-
222 See  Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-80 (1990).
223 Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 714-16
(1994) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Employment Div. , 494 U.S. at 890).
224 This very distinction was emphasized anew by the Court in Cutter v. Wilkin-
son , 125 S. Ct. 2113 (2005), in support of RLUIPA, which affords greater protection
to religious rights than other constitutionally protected rights. See supra  text accom-
panying notes 142-56.
225 540 U.S. 712 (2004).
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\84-4\ORE401.txt unknown Seq: 49 28-MAR-06 15:18
Religious Freedom and “Accommodationist Neutrality” 983
vate or public state institution, except if the student was pursuing
a degree in devotional theology while receiving the scholar-
ship.226  Joshua Davey challenged this exception on multiple con-
stitutional grounds.227  Despite the complexities of the case, and
the view of some commentators that Davey’s case “appeared to
be a slam dunk under Lukumi ,”228 six members of the Court
rejected Davey’s claims.  In a somewhat terse opinion, Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist noted that the exception from the Program was a
valid attempt to avoid a state constitutional violation, and did not
violate the Free Exercise Clause of the Federal Constitution.229
The statute’s facial reference to degrees that are “devotional in
nature or designed to induce religious faith”230 did not render the
act presumptively unconstitutional, because:
[T]he State’s disfavor of religion (if it can be called that) . . .
imposes neither criminal nor civil sanctions on any type of re-
ligious service or rite.  It does not deny to ministers the right
to participate in the political affairs of the community. And it
does not require students to choose between their religious
beliefs and receiving a government benefit. The State has
merely chosen not to fund a distinct category of instruction.231
Chief Justice Rehnquist also rejected the argument that if the
state funds training for all secular programs it must also fund
training for religious professions because these “are not fungi-
ble” categories.232  Rather, religion is unique because both the
federal and state constitutions favor free exercise and oppose es-
tablishment.233  There is “no counterpart with respect to other
callings or professions.”234  Thus, the different treatment of edu-
cation for the ministry “is a product of [those] views, not evi-
dence of hostility toward religion.”235  Finally, Chief Justice
226 Id.  at 715-16.
227 Id.  at 718.
228 Douglas Laycock, Theology Scholarships, the Pledge of Allegiance, and Relig-
ious Liberty:  Avoiding the Extremes But Missing the Liberty , 118 HARV. L. REV.
155, 173 (2004).
229 Davey , 540 U.S. at 724-25.
230 Id.  at 716.
231 Id.  at 720-21 (citations omitted).  The opinion in Davey  tracks similar language
in Rust v. Sullivan , also authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist. See  Rust v. Sullivan,
500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991) (noting that the government had merely made a decision
“to fund one activity to the exclusion of another,” which was not viewpoint
discrimination).
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Rehnquist concluded that the exclusion of students majoring in
theology from the scholarship program was not a violation of
freedom of speech or equal protection.236
Justice Scalia dissented—predictably and vigorously—from
these views, and took issue in particular with the claim that the
discrimination against religion here imposed only a slight burden
on Mr. Davey.237  On the contrary, Justice Scalia observed, a stat-
ute’s facial discrimination against religion is “so profound that
the concrete harm produced can never be dismissed as insubstan-
tial.”238  Moreover, the state’s motivations were not, in Justice
Scalia’s view, benign.239  Washingtonians accepted the exclusion
of citizens pursuing theology degrees from scholarship eligibility
because they are:
[P]ractitioners of only a tepid, civic version of faith.  Those the
statutory exclusion actually affects—those whose belief in
their religion is so strong that they dedicate their study and
their lives to its ministry—are a far narrower set. One need
not delve too far into modern popular culture to perceive a
trendy disdain for deep religious conviction.240
In this same passage, Justice Scalia sarcastically noted that the
Court had been “so quick to come to the aid of other disfavored
groups,” citing case law that prevented discrimination on the ba-
sis of sexual orientation, whereas here it refused to prevent “a
form of discrimination to which the Constitution actually
speaks.”241
B. Defending  Davey
Davey  was not an analytically satisfying decision, given the
many competing arguments to the outcome that the opinion ig-
nored or glossed over quickly.  Moreover, Justice Scalia’s insis-
tence that the discrimination in Davey  was indistinguishable
from discrimination against other disfavored groups has force.
Equal protection law treats intentional discrimination against a
suspect class as presumptively unconstitutional, whereas facially
236 Id.  at 725.  According to Chief Justice Rehnquist, the funding of education is
not comparable to the funding of a public forum under Rosenberger . Id.  at 720 n.3.
As for the equal protection claim, the state measure need only be “rational.” Id.
237 Id.  at 731 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
238 Id.
239 Id.  at 733.
240 Id.
241 Id.  (citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996)).
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neutral laws that produce the same impact against the same class
trigger only rational basis review, absent other proof of intent.242
If one reads these areas of law as synergistic and aimed at a com-
mon target, a statute that facially excludes only sectarian uses of
public funds does appear problematic.
Yet, there is no obvious reason why the law of religion must be
read in synergy with equal protection law, and there are many
good reasons not  to do so.  For one thing, the clauses serve dif-
ferent purposes, were adopted at different times, and presuppose
different things.  The statutory inclusion of peyote among the
state’s controlled substance prohibitions in Employment Division
v. Smith243 surely appeared facially hostile to Native American
Church members who regard peyote as an important part of their
religious rituals. Although expressed differently, the burdens
placed on religious minorities in both situations were equally
profound to the sincere religious observers who were affected. In
fact, the impact on religious observers in Smith  was forceful and
direct: ingestion of peyote was prohibited.  In Davey , the impact
was indirect: Washington State college students can still pursue
theological training, just not with state scholarship support.
In any event, Justice Scalia’s primary objection to the re-
quested accommodation in Smith  was not focused on the intent
of legislators in drafting the legislation in question or even on the
burden it placed upon religious adherents.  Rather, he worried
about the consequences for democracy of permitting religious
dissenters to follow their own course rather than the rules set
down by the majority.244  That is, Justice Scalia did not view fail-
ure to accommodate religion in Smith  as perforce hostile to relig-
ion, given the necessary limits of religious autonomy within a
plural society.245  It is, thus, arguably inconsistent to embrace
Smith but not Davey .
To require states to fund religious ends whenever they fund
comparable secular ones that offer similar benefits would also
violate many conservatives’ notions of judicial restraint.  For ex-
ample, support for majoritarian moral values explains much
(though surely not all) of many conservatives’ objections to fed-
242 See e.g. , Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Personnel Adm’r v. Feeney,
442 U.S. 256 (1979).
243 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
244 Id.  at 878-80.
245 Id.
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eral constitutional protection of gay rights.  Such conservatives
argue that the constitutional right, such as it is, supplants major-
ity conceptions of morality, in deference to elitist liberal pres-
sures to expand the Constitution beyond textual authority.246
Yet, to respect legislative power in one context and not others247
makes little sense.  In both, this respect logically  should be one
value to be weighed among several others, though it may be
overcome by other legitimate concerns.
Another potentially worrisome upshot of imposing a
mandatory equal funding rule is that non-mainstream religions—
for example, the white supremacist religion seeking accommoda-
tion in Cutter248—should be entitled to support along with the
more influential, well-accepted, and socially prominent reli-
gions.249 Religion comes in many forms, as do ideas that surely
will be motivated to seek equal treatment when it comes with
government funds.250  A neutrality umbrella is especially useful
246 See, e.g. , Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 599 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
247 Obviously, Justice Scalia is pursuing a larger goal here, as to which he is consis-
tent:  judicial protection of religious minorities as against majoritarian forces is con-
stitutionally required.  Judicial protection of sexual minorities as against such forces
is not.  My point is that it is not obvious why democratic outcomes as such are con-
demned as “trendy” in one context and not in the other.  Responsiveness to cultural
transformation and social trends presumably is the province of the legislative
branch, according to Scalia’s accounts of the separation of powers.
248 See supra  text accompanying note 145.
249 One important distinction among religions, drawn from Robert D. Putnam’s
work on democracy, is between “bonding” and “bridging” religions, “with the latter
being the more inclusive, civic, and liberal democratic in orientation.”  Macedo,
supra  note 1, at 1586.
250 The potential financial gains for religious applicants are significant. See  Laura
Meckler, “Faith-Based” Groups Got $1B in 2003 , ARIZ. DAILY STAR (Tucson), Jan.
3, 2005, at A4 (reporting that the “government gave more than $1 billion in 2003 to
organizations it considers ‘faith-based,’ with some going to programs where prayer
and spiritual guidance are central and some to organizations that do not consider
themselves religious at all”).  The federal government has granted more than $1 mil-
lion to fund a nationwide program called the Silver Ring Thing, which is an offshoot
of the John Guest Evangelistic Team, a Pennsylvania-based ministry.  The program
promotes premarital abstinence through musical comedy and skits. See ACLU
Challenges Abstinence Program , USA TODAY, May 17, 2005, at 3A; cf. MARK
CHAVES, CONGREGATIONS IN AMERICA 44-93 (2004) [hereinafter CHAVES, CON-
GREGATIONS] (describing the involvement of congregations in provision of social
services, including access to government funding for these programs, and noting that
assumptions about the distinctive, holistic nature of faith-based provision of social
services is belied by substantial evidence about actual delivery of services); Mark
Chaves, Debunking Charitable Choice:  The Evidence Does Not Support the Political
Left or Right , STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV., Summer 2003, at 28, 32 (“[T]here is no
substantial discrimination against religious organizations in public funding streams.
Isolated instances . . . should be placed in the larger context of extensive and effec-
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for minority or fringe religious groups seeking public funds be-
cause their interests are most likely to be overlooked by
legislatures.
From a liberalism perspective, of course, this leveling effect of
a strict neutrality approach to funding is a positive feature be-
cause it allows courts to monitor discriminatory distributions of
public funds and may maximize pluralism outcomes by compel-
ling government agnosticism toward substantive ends embraced
by various religions.  Examined more closely, however, this po-
tential upside does not outweigh the countless downsides of man-
dating equal funding for religion, even from a liberalism
perspective.
First, the potential sociopolitical impacts of constitutionally
mandated funding of viewpoints that are anathema to a vast ma-
jority of citizens, including Satanism and white supremacist reli-
gions, are difficult to measure, to say the least.  One of these
potential impacts might be the erosion of government power to
sustain liberal democratic values, rather than promotion of wor-
thy pluralism.  In the speech realm, liberal neutrality means we
should just avert our eyes251 or engage in counter speech252 when
confronted with speech that violates liberal democratic values.
When speech becomes too threatening to public order, it can be
controlled.  There is a significant difference, though, between
government neutrality vis-à-vis viewpoints expressed in tradi-
tional public fora and mandating neutral public funding of
messages, especially when the messages are brigaded with con-
duct and evangelist methods.253
Consequently, asking citizens to respect adherents’ right to un-
dergo religious training regardless of the religion’s credo is fairly
easy.  Asking citizens to pay for this training is not.  The practical
tive cooperation.”). See generally STEPHEN V. MONSMA, WHEN SACRED AND SECU-
LAR MIX 63-80, 104-05 (1996) (discussing substantial government support of
religious charities).
251 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971).
252 See  Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)
(“[T]he fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones.”), overruled in part by  Bran-
denburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
253 Lower courts have respected this distinction in cases challenging government
refusals to grant public benefits to groups that discriminate in membership such as
the Boy Scouts. See, e.g. , Evans v. City of Berkeley, 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d 696 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2002), petition for review granted , 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d 910 (2003); Boy Scouts of
Am. v. Wyman, 213 F. Supp. 2d 159 (D. Conn. 2002), aff’d , 335 F.3d 80 (2d Cir.
2003).
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and constitutional difficulties with the latter mandate become es-
pecially grave when citizens are asked to underwrite religious in-
struction that teaches the moral justifiability of refusing to
employ, rent apartments to, or grant other basic rights to non-
adherents.  A tepid, civic version of faith that does not make
these demands on adherents thus is easier to accommodate than
a passionate version of faith, because the latter may clash more
violently with the civic values at stake in the inevitable balance
between individual and collective will,254 not because of hostility
to sincere religious devotion.  Constitutionally mandated neutral-
ity offers no evaluative mechanism for choosing among these re-
cipients of government support.
Constitutionally mandated funding of religious entities based
upon neutrality principles also would invigorate challenges to
other government funding programs.  For example, government
funding rules bar providing abortion services for poor women,
which currently is permitted under federal conditional spending
case law.255  Yet, these restrictions are surely ideologically spe-
cific and viewpoint-based.  Strictly enforced, government neutral-
ity in funding could compromise government’s ability to endorse
many non-neutral ends, such as sexual abstinence, tolerance, de-
cency standards, or liberalism itself, without also funding diamet-
rically opposed ideas.  Because the religion cases that require
equal access and, by extension, equal funding rely upon freedom
of expression neutrality principles, they should apply equally to
all  value-laden government programs, not just ones that express
values that have religious resonance.  Unless neutrality in public
funding applies with special force in religious/secular contexts,
which would be an exceedingly odd outcome given the Establish-
ment Clause, then insisting on it there could have profound and
254 See  Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy , 59 U. CHI. L.
REV. 195, 201 (1992) (“If the baseline from which to measure establishment or free
exercise violations is the exercise of religious liberty insofar as compatible with the
establishment of the secular public order, the secularization of the public order is
not ‘discrimination’ against religion. . . . But the Court should also take a broader
view of free exercise so long as religion does not genuinely threaten to undermine
the secular welfare state.”); cf.  Steven G. Gey, Unity of the Graveyard and the At-
tack on Constitutional Secularism , 2004 BYU L. REV. 1005, 1011 (noting that “the
religious framework is peculiarly unsuited to the quest for [national] unity because
the very design of that framework is configured around notions of inclusion and
exclusion”).
255 Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); see also  Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297
(1980) (upholding prohibition of use of Medicaid funds to perform abortions, except
in very narrow circumstances).
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undesirable implications for the structure of all government
funding programs.  Courts also would be obliged to umpire far
more of these funding disputes than they already do, which is an
outcome that should worry those who fear judicial interference
with popular will generally and who worry in particular about
judicial oversight of the highly political process of crafting gov-
ernment budget priorities and spending policies.
We already know from experiences with neutrality-based equal
access demands in public schools and other public fora that these
demands can lead to politically fraught collisions.  Pursuit of neu-
trality in the face of deep-seated hostility toward disfavored per-
spectives can have powerful boomerang effects that undermine
tolerance and pluralism.  Mandatory access for student religious
groups led to similar access demands by gay student groups,
among others,256 which could not be denied without violating
neutrality.  In some schools, this prompted a “spite your face”
response: officials closed the forum down altogether, rather than
allow access to unpopular student groups.257  This outcome may
be acceptable to those who believe strict neutrality is the proper
baseline no matter what  follows, but others, myself included,
worry about the real world implications of imposing this commit-
ment on an unwilling public as a matter of constitutional law.
Closing down public schools as venues for all extracurricular ac-
tivities is a significant hardship for student activities and commu-
nity groups, to be sure.  But closing down government-funded
programs, which include public K-12 education, to avoid funding
disfavored ends would be devastating.  Federal and state funding
programs are an essential part of the operating budgets for many
worthy recipients, especially public schools, such that ending or
limiting public funding to avoid controversy over disfavored pro-
grams could have cataclysmic consequences.  The risk of these
responses is especially grave in difficult economic times, like the
present, when state and federal legislators are scrambling to ad-
256 Karen Diegmueller, Salt Lake City Prepares List of Banned Clubs , EDUC.
WK., May 1, 1996, at 3 (reporting on various student groups that sought to use
school facilities on an equal basis under a 1984 law).
257 E.g. , Mark Walsh, Gay Students’ Request Spurs Board to Cut Clubs , EDUC.
WK., Feb. 28, 1996, at 6 (reporting that a Salt Lake City school board voted to elimi-
nate all extracurricular clubs rather than allow formation of a high school gay stu-
dent support group).  The efforts to keep gay student groups from meeting have not
abated. See  Michael Janofsky, Gay Rights Battlefields Spread to Public Schools ,
N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2005, at A18 (reporting on challenges to school activities aimed
at promoting acceptance of gays and lesbians).
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dress a wide range of unmet funding needs, including some that
are essentially nondiscretionary under prevailing law.  Legisla-
tors who are opposed to public education or government pro-
grams for ideological reasons will have a much easier time
cutting them off if they can argue that the Constitution requires
all-or-nothing funding responses across like programs.  Even
when law prohibits legislators from cutting off funds for a partic-
ular public program, however, a mandatory funding principle di-
lutes available funds for other preferred ends and interposes
judicial authority in a zone that is inherently political and local.
If equal funding does become mandatory as a matter of consti-
tutional law, then government also will become far more inter-
ested in attaching conditions on its spending to prevent the
promotion of ends with which it disagrees.  Consider, in this re-
gard, the conditions that were placed on the vouchers approved
by the Court in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris , which (ironically)
included a prohibition on discrimination in admissions on the ba-
sis of religion.258  Attaching such conditions will become the only
way for government to prevent diversion of public funds to ends
with which it disagrees, if equal funding becomes a constitutional
command.
Consequently, unless religious groups win on all  counts—
mandatory entitlement to public funding and  mandatory exemp-
tion from any conditions on the funding that conflict with the
religion’s beliefs—then a funding entitlement victory may prove,
over time, to be a hollow one.  Adherents not only will see gov-
ernment support flowing to the secular ends with which they dis-
agree, but also to other religious ends that are directly
antithetical to Judeo-Christian values.  Alternatively, they may
find themselves accepting funds conditioned on compromising
their religious sensibilities and autonomy. Although they can
“just say no” to the money, they may find it difficult to forgo
significant government resources, especially after they have be-
come accustomed to them.  The result may be that they secular-
ize or otherwise adjust their religious conduct in order to qualify
for public funds.  Consider, in this regard, how major research
universities have found it impossible to refuse government fund-
ing that is conditioned on allowing access to military recruiters.
The siren call of funding subject to conditions that recipients find
odious can be a powerful one indeed, particularly in an era of
258 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
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dwindling resources for entities historically dependent upon pub-
lic funds for survival.259
Yet to deny government the right to impose value-laden condi-
tions on its funding would be absurd.  The power of the purse
exists to enable government to deploy collective resources for
collective ends.  For religious groups to demand the money minus
the conditions is a “heads we win, tails you lose” strategy that
runs afoul of countless other collective interests and principles of
government funding.  It also paves the way for other groups to
follow suit if the new neutrality principles truly apply across the
board.
For all these reasons, neutrality is an inappropriate baseline for
funding cases.  Government spending policies are inescapably
and importantly non-neutral.  As Stephen Macedo has said, “lib-
eral democratic values such as inclusion, equality, and individual
freedom will often support regulations and conditions on public
funding schemes that have the effect of bridging associations
across the spectrum.”260  For example, government preference
for “bridging associations” (i.e., ones that emphasize the civic
value of inclusion) over “bonding associations” (i.e., ones that
are insular and critical of inclusion, equality, and individual free-
dom) is plainly not  a neutral government end, and rightly so.
Unless we wish to strip government of the power to encourage
bridging across citizens through funding programs and otherwise,
then neutrality is the wrong tack.
Risking all of these untoward effects of constitutional doctrine
that makes neutral funding mandatory still might be plausible,
though problematic, if religious groups today lacked reasonable
alternatives to achieve their goals, or were experiencing wide-
spread discrimination by private and public forces.  Neither prob-
lem, however, exists.  On the contrary, American law and politics
incentivize state and federal legislators to fund mainstream reli-
gions beyond what is required by the Constitution. Voting in
favor of faith-based charities, vouchers, and other funding op-
259 I am hardly the first person to worry about these potential boomerang effects
of mandatory or even permissive funding of religion, but they bear repeating.  For a
concise rehearsal of these issues, see David Saperstein, Public Accountability and
Faith-Based Organizations:  A Problem Best Avoided , 116 HARV. L. REV. 1353
(2003).
260 Macedo, supra  note 1, at 1589; cf.  Sullivan, supra  note 254, at 201 (arguing
that “liberal democracy is the overarching belief system for politics, if not for knowl-
edge,” and should inform the constitutional meaning of religious freedoms).
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tions satisfies more political pressure than it inspires in many
cases, and places the politicians on the side of the religious com-
munity in any litigation that might ensue. Judges must then con-
clude that the funding is a legitimate expression of the will of the
people, or risk being cast as anti-religious and obstructionist of
legitimate legislative will.
There also is no compelling evidence that American religious
groups, as such, currently are suffering from such pervasive dis-
crimination.  We have a federal White House Office of Faith-
Based and Community Initiatives, with a welcoming website that
makes the funding applications process as transparent and user
friendly as possible.261  Moreover, scholars who have investigated
the issue have found no systematic evidence to support the gen-
erally assumed claim that faith-based providers of social services
typically and actually are more effective and holistic than secular
ones.262  These particular bases for public support of religion thus
are infirm.  They surely do not support the far more adventure-
some claim that mandatory  public support for religion is a neces-
sary step toward protecting religious freedom.
One thing is clear.  The political and legal strife that govern-
ment funding of religion inspires will not ease if courts demand
that funding occur as a matter of constitutional law.  Indeed, the
strife may escalate.  A constitutional mandate could alter the
tone of debates over the pros and cons of government support of
religious ends.  Government officials once could say, credibly,
that decisions not to fund religion were required by the Constitu-
tion. Today, that response is doctrinally dubious and politically
unpopular.
Of course some officials still might refuse to vote for funding
of religion because they believe that separation of church and
state is a sensible policy, even when not required.  Alternatively,
they may worry about the dissipation of scarce public resources
to these private ends, may object to the practices of some reli-
gions that would benefit from mandatory, neutrality-driven fund-
ing, or may be concerned about state restrictions on funding of
religion that are stricter than federal law.  All of these arguments
should stand or fall on their own merits.
261 White House Office of Faith-Based & Community Initiatives, Charitable
Choice:  The Facts, http://www.whitehouse.gov/government/fbci/guidance/ charita-
ble.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2006).
262 CHAVES, CONGREGATIONS, supra  note 250, at 61-93.
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If, however, the Court compels funding of religious ends when-
ever they match up with comparable secular endeavors as a mat-
ter of constitutional law , then these policy objections to public
support for religion change character.  They can be recast as dis-
criminatory and hostile attempts to deny religious citizens their
constitutionally protected share of the public pie, rather than as
appeals to alternative visions of the public interest and the con-
founding balance between religion and state.
This is hardly a far-fetched or abstract concern.  Recall that
Justice Scalia already accused the Washington legislature of
“trendy disdain for deep religious conviction,”263 rather than
seeking a balance between religion and state interests in good
faith. Scalia’s dark construction of the Washington State legisla-
ture’s motives sounds unduly harsh to some ears, almost as
though he too “has mistaken a Kulturkampf for a fit of spite.”264
But if funding is a matter of constitutional equity or neutrality,
then non-funding of religion does appear sinister.  Further vitali-
zation of free exercise, freedom of expression, and freedom of
expressive association rights thus not only would cut off valuable
state and federal legislative discretion.  A mandatory constitu-
tional rule in this area also would sharpen the rhetorical knives in
an already exceptionally intense and abrasive cultural conflict.
Advocates of mandatory funding may counter all of these ar-
guments with the following, increasingly powerful claim: the sub-
stantive good in preserving government discretion over funding
depends entirely on the principles and values of the government
currently in power.  Citizens who pay taxes faithfully and disa-
gree strongly with state or federal policy are attracted in particu-
lar to arguments against giving any political regime broad
discretion to determine the ideological context and scope of
funding programs.
The argument has considerable force when, as now, one politi-
cal party controls all branches of the federal government and of
many state governments.  If the federal and state governments
already are aligned to support quite conservative religious ends,
then why not demand, as a matter of balance, that all religious
ends receive the same treatment?  Likewise, when religious ac-
tors pursue secular ends that government deems worthy, why
should they be denied funding for these secular ends simply be-
263 Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 733 (2004).
264 See  Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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cause they happen to be religious entities that also pursue secta-
rian ends?  The spending power of modern government wields
awesome force over citizen behaviors.  If one cares about the
non-coercive and ideologically neutral exercise of that power,
doesn’t imposing neutrality constraints on government spending
make good, liberal sense?
These concerns about potentially unwise, discriminatory, or il-
liberal government funding choices are extremely important
ones, but even these do not warrant the radical step of constitu-
tionally mandated funding of religion.  Again, the government
constantly makes intensely value-laden funding choices—includ-
ing viewpoint-specific ones.  The boundaries of the political pro-
cess and the judicially enforced unconstitutional conditions
doctrine already prevent the government from conditioning ac-
cess to public benefits on the forfeiture of constitutional rights.
The latter restraint is murky, to say the least, but remains availa-
ble as a means of policing the worst-case constitutional abuses of
government spending power, while giving the legislature ample
room to express its often messy and controversial preferences
through spending without judicial interference.  Moreover, dis-
crimination among  religious supplicants is already unlawful.  The
Establishment Clause still imposes this much restraint on govern-
ment power, by anyone’s account of neutrality.  In my view, we
do not need to add another layer of constitutional protection to
assure these results.
As for the argument that excluding all religious entities from
public funding programs when they perform the secular functions
of a particular program is senseless hostility to religion, I believe
that Chief Justice Rehnquist’s response in Davey  remains the
best one, and should be given greater attention in all  religious
freedom cases.  Religion alone  triggers Establishment Clause-
type anxieties.  Thus, government actors should be allowed to re-
spect the lingering and quite powerful sense that separationism
has value, and that a prophylactic approach to lurking Establish-
ment Clause problems may be sound government policy.  The
“play in the joints” that allows government to grant non-
mandatory concessions to religion, out of respect for free exer-
cise concerns, should be matched by sufficient “play” that main-
tains non-mandatory boundaries between religion and
government, out of respect for Establishment Clause concerns.
Finally, the failure to publicly fund a worthy end is not, by it-
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self, equivalent to proscribing or developing that end.  In every
budget cycle, government actors must make agonizing choices
among vying, important purposes, many of which would further
constitutional values if funded.  Funding some of these to the ex-
clusion of others is not, by itself, convincing evidence of antago-
nism toward the unsuccessful applicants, or even of a lack of
commitment to their programs.
For all of these reasons, Davey  was a prudent, if analytically
imperfect, outcome with ample doctrinal support.  It evidenced a
Court aware of the zero-sum nature of public funds, and wary of
stepping out too far beyond the intuition expressed in 1947 that,
“[n]o tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support
any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be
called, or whatever from [sic] they may adopt to teach or practice
religion.”265 Naturally, this intuition must be balanced against the
rest of the equation, also expressed in l947, that individuals can-
not be excluded “because of  their faith, or lack of it, from receiv-
ing the benefits of public welfare legislation.”266  That balance
requires that when religion is excluded from a funding program
there must be a good secular reason for the exclusion. Reasona-
bly well-developed case law recognizes that government choices
not to fund certain programs are inevitable, and that efficiency
and democratic principles require that government be allowed to
make these decisions without constant or exacting scrutiny by the
courts.  The exclusion of religion from a funding opportunity as a
category , versus an exclusion aimed at a particular sect , is a ra-
tional government spending choice, subject to sensible judicially
enforced limits on abuse of that choice.
Most importantly, for purposes of this Article, Davey  essen-
tially rejected the viewpoint neutrality analogy to freedom of ex-
pression cases in the funding context.  Instead, the Court tracked
back to the more familiar understanding that religion is a distinc-
tive practice that cannot  be equated with all other activities that
might garner government support.  This understanding, I submit,
is both correct and needs to be reinforced rather than weakened
as the Court moves forward.  Absent the rare showing that a gov-
ernment spending program is itself expressly designed to create a
public forum for private expressive activity,267 the neutrality
265 Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (l947).
266 Id.  (emphasis added).
267 See, e.g. , Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819
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principles of Widmar , et al., should not apply to funding cases.  A
(1995).  I thus must disagree with the ever-insightful Professor Doug Laycock, who
describes the Court’s ruling in Davey  as creating “the worst of all worlds” because
the “current doctrinal combination—few limits on funding, few limits on discrimina-
tion in funding programs, and few limits on conditions attached to funding—maxi-
mizes government power over religion.”  Laycock, supra  note 228, at 196, 199.  In
Laycock’s view, for government to fund secular but not religious programs that pro-
vide the same secular benefits “is rank discrimination, with the immediate and obvi-
ous effect of discouraging or penalizing the free exercise of religion.” Id.  at 199.  If
non-funding discourages or penalizes religion, however, it does so in ways that come
with the funding territory, which include government-funded abstinence programs,
among other viewpoint sensitive measures.  All distinctions among government-
funded ideas are not discrimination in a sinister sense, and non-funding is rarely, by
itself, coercive enough to violate the constitutional conditions doctrine.  Moreover,
to call non-funding of religion “rank discrimination” is to stand at least one admit-
tedly passé but still powerful chapter of Establishment Clause case law, separation-
ism, on its head.
Laycock’s argument also presupposes religion’s exceptionalism in a context where
it should not be assumed—government funding—and underplays why religion’s ex-
ceptionalism makes funding problems especially  problematic.  Again, funding is dif-
ferent from freedom to believe or act on one’s religious convictions.  Government
noninterference with these liberties, insofar as possible in a democratic order, is a
worthy goal.  In the funding context, however, any exceptionalism of religion points
against religion rather than for it.  Asking Americans to tolerate religious pluralism,
to accommodate religious workers, and to embrace religious symbolism in the mo-
saic of our collective identity is one thing.  Requiring us to fund these activities,
whether directly or indirectly, is quite another.  We should not underestimate our
deep differences at this level, or assume that our hard-earned civic virtue of toler-
ance at these other levels is unshakable.
Finally, Laycock’s argument accepts the neutrality principle (which he defines as
“substantive neutrality”) as the overarching baseline for religious freedom
problems.  He insists that this is why litigants can challenge government-endorsed
religious symbols, even absent a substantial burden. Id.  at 177.  If one accepts his
account of the baseline meaning of the religious clauses—which both demand that
government maintain neutrality in this unique domain—then Davey  probably was
wrongly decided and mandatory funding should be the Court’s next step toward
protecting this guarantee.  Laycock also argues that government need not be neutral
vis-à-vis abortion funding. Id.  at 176-77.  The reason why government can refuse to
fund abortions for indigent women is because abortion rights are defined as freedom
from substantial government burdens on the right, not a positive right to neutrality.
See also  Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality To-
ward Religion , 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 993 (1990) (discussing his theory of “substantive
neutrality” toward religion).
Laycock is hardly alone in embracing the neutrality framework for religious free-
doms.  Many of these works build from the seminal scholarship of Philip Kurland.
See  Philip B. Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court , 29 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1 (1961); see also  Ira C. Lupu and Robert Tuttle, The Distinctive Place of Relig-
ious Entities in Our Constitutional Order , 47 VILL. L. REV. 37 (2002) (discussing the
competing paradigms of separationism and neutralism and concluding that courts
should require neutrality unless the distinctive characteristics of religious entities
require different treatment). But see  Daniel O. Conkle, Different Religions, Differ-
ent Politics:  Evaluating the Role of Competing Religious Traditions in American
Politics and Law , 10 J.L. & RELIGION 1, 12 (1994) (arguing that “religions are not
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neutrality baseline only makes sense where freedom of expres-
sion features predominate.268
Indeed, the Court’s recent experiment of allowing substantial
government funding to flow to explicitly religious ends if directed
there by private hands, and to flow to religious entities directly if
it meets the Court’s criteria for direct aid, is already fraught.  As
it moves forward, the Court should resist the far more perilous
step of requiring government funding of religion whenever the
government funds comparably situated non-religious entities.  At
the very least, it should require convincing evidence that the cur-
rent state of affairs actually produces harms to religious freedoms
that outweigh the many practical and theoretical risks of such a
dramatic shift in constitutional law.  At the most, however, it
should reconsider the aspects of current doctrine that brought us
to this awkward moment, where neutrality logically implies af-
firmative support for sectarian ends, rather than separation be-
tween government and religious activities.
CONCLUSION
The following doctrinal moves have occurred under the mantle
of accommodationist neutrality:
• The First Amendment requires accommodation of speech
about religion, accommodation of religious speech, and even
religious worship.
• Religion no longer is categorically distinct from all other
forms of personal belief and action; under freedom of expres-
sion it is one viewpoint among many.
• The Constitution allows and sometimes requires government
to exempt religious people and associations from general
laws.
• The Constitution does not demand strict separation of church
and state in funding cases; it allows neutral assistance that
may include substantial funding, and logically may even re-
quire funding.
If this sounds like a litigation blueprint for Mrs. Vicki Frost, it
is .  This is significant for at least three reasons.
First, it proves that the Court has been deeply respectful of
generic, and their differences may significantly affect the value of their contributions
to America’s public life”).
268 Freedom of speech doctrine did, after all, give us the memorable phrase “one
man’s vulgarity is another’s lyric.”  Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971).
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religion and has created many new constitutional opportunities
for its expression by government and private citizens.  High-
pitched claims of judicial “hostility to religion” are utterly belied
by the Court’s actual practices.  Second, an accommodationist
neutrality approach to religious freedom creates a profound fis-
sure within constitutional doctrine that suggests that funding re-
ligion should be required whenever secular entities are funded
for similar activities and the funding serves an ostensibly neutral
purpose.  The many untoward consequences of a constitutionally
mandated neutral funding principle outweigh the potential bene-
fits of such a mandate.  Finally and most fundamentally, neutral-
ity is an inappropriate, pervasive baseline for religious freedoms.
Neutrality works well as applied to freedom of religious expres-
sion problems, but it is not an analytically sound baseline in most
other arenas where government inevitably and properly must im-
pose non-neutral values.  It also denies religion’s exceptionalism
in ways that conflict with constitutional text and with popular
and judicially enforced intuitions to the contrary.  Most impor-
tantly, neutrality could undermine government’s ability to fur-
ther non-neutral liberal democratic ends.
Thus, the proper course is for the Roberts Court to maintain
the sensible line between religion and state drawn in Davey , and
to construe narrowly, if not overrule, doctrine that implies Davey
was wrongly decided.  I also believe that the Court should ac-
knowledge that a neutrality principle—separationist or accom-
modationist—is not sufficiently nuanced or substantively robust
to capture the complex balance between secularism and religion,
and should abandon that rubric.
I say this mindful of the powerful desire to embrace a straight-
forward and elegant framework for religious freedom problems.
The dreadful mess of older Establishment Clause case law, which
could only be mastered by memorizing results about maps,
globes, textbooks, and fields trips, clearly cried out for a better
model.  As Justice Souter recently noted, however, there is no
single, analytically pure principle or metaphor that is adequate to
govern the unruly terrain of incommensurable values at stake in
this realm.269  The Court’s accommodationist neutrality principle
269 See  McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2742 (2005) (noting
that “an elegant interpretative rule to draw the line in all the multifarious situations
[to which the religion clauses apply] is not to be had”).  For an excellent recent
expression of the multiple values at stake, see Steven H. Shiffrin, The Pluralistic
Foundations of the Religion Clauses , 90 CORNELL L. REV. 9 (2004).
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is no exception.270
The reason for this is that the Constitution protects religious
liberty as only one part of an overarching commitment to a lib-
eral democratic order.  This is an inherently dynamic commit-
ment that entails an ongoing complex and pragmatic balance of
incommensurables.  Consequently, constitutional doctrine in the
realm of individual rights, perhaps especially in the realm of re-
ligious freedom, will continue to produce nonlinear, sometimes
untidy compromises, as judges seek to achieve this larger bal-
ance. Neutrality should remain an important analytical tool in
this process,271 but cannot be the whole kit,272 or even the base
from which the balance proceeds.  This is because neutrality has
nothing to say about the non-neutral boundaries  that liberal
democratic commitments impose on individual rights,273 and can-
not account for the constitutionally and politically distinctive as-
pects of religion.  Again, religious commitments are uniquely
powerful drivers of human conduct that must be accommodated
and respected by a liberal democratic government, but only
within the substantive boundaries imposed by a non-neutral com-
mitment to liberal democratic values.  This paradox is as well
known as it is confounding.  Doctrine that downplays or ignores
this paradox inevitably falters because it emphasizes abstractions
over practical consequences and analytical symmetry over the
tapestry of incommensurable constitutional values.
270 Our experience with other constitutional freedoms supports this conclusion.
“Equality” wears multiple faces under the Equal Protection Cause.  “Freedom of
speech” emerges in a dizzying array of doctrinal scenarios that belie the utterly mis-
leading bromide that all government content-based discrimination triggers strict
scrutiny.  The constitutional command to create space for religion without allowing
it to dominate all else likewise cannot be achieved by drawing one straight line
across the constitutional case law and decreeing that the answer to all of these di-
lemmas is to respect neutrality.
271 As Justice Souter has noted, “invoking neutrality is a prudent way of keeping
sight of something the Framers of the First Amendment thought important.” Mc-
Creary , 125 S. Ct. at 2743.
272 In this respect, I resonate to Martha Minow’s call for a new metaphor in the
realm of public-private relations that can “promote a kind of political pluralism that
makes the state simply one of many sources of normative affiliation and associa-
tion.”  Martha Minow, Partners, Not Rivals?:  Redrawing the Lines Between Public
and Private, Non-Profit and Profit, and Secular and Religious , 80 B.U. L. REV. 1061,
1094 (2000).  I would pluralize this, though, and call for new metaphors.  One meta-
phor is unlikely to achieve the complex goals she admires.
273 See  Macedo, supra  note 1, at 1593 (arguing that ideals of a civil society based
upon liberal democracy cannot remain neutral toward private associative choices,
including choices among religious associations); see also  Sullivan, supra  note 254, at
201.
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This does not mean the Court should engage in ad hoc, willy-
nilly reliance on personal predilections.  It means that religious
freedom issues require pragmatic evaluations of the likely conse-
quences of government policies for religious autonomy and genu-
ine respect for the competing interests.  They also require a kind
of faith that seems to be falling rapidly out of fashion—faith in a
civic order bound by liberal democratic principles.  Many adher-
ents to this civic faith, myself among them, favor support for
these principles even when they conflict with our personal relig-
ious values, though we also believe that government and the
courts should first seek ways to accommodate both positions.
Such an approach is not hostile to religion.  It is an attempt to
respect religion as a fundamental individual liberty, while also
recognizing the fact that religion can present unique and deeply
distressing challenges to liberalism.  It is also based on the notion
that genuine respect for religious devotion means respect for this
devotion’s awesome power, especially when it is channeled
through the formidable power of government.
The Rehnquist Court solidified government power to respect
religious perspectives, contrary to popular claims to the contrary.
The Roberts Court must now be equally attentive to the impor-
tance of boundaries on that power, and on religious autonomy
itself, in the interest of liberal democratic principles.  It must also
embrace its unique role in policing these boundaries, regardless
of the political heat it may incur for performing this crucial con-
stitutional function.
